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CONTENTS

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

CZECH REPUBLIC

- * Prime Minister Klaus Views Czech Health Care [CESKY DENIK 12 Mar] 1
- * Battek Discusses New CSSD Chairman [CESKY DENIK 10 Mar] 2

HUNGARY

- * Parliament Withdraws Agreement With Ukraine [MAGYAR HIRLAP 11 Mar] 4
- * Legal Proceedings Against Skinheads Begin [MAGYAR HIRLAP 12 Mar] 4
- * Viewer in Romania Praises Budapest's Duna TV [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 25 Feb] 5
- * 'Strike Atmosphere' at Paks Nuclear Power Plant [MAGYAR HIRLAP 13 Mar] 5
- * AVU To Publicize Salable Properties [FIGYELO 18 Mar] 6

POLAND

- * Poll Shows Political Preferences, Major Issues [WPROST 7 Mar] 7

ROMANIA

- New Romanian Magazine Characterized as Racist [BARICADA 23 Mar] 9

SLOVAKIA

- * Recent Czech Political Developments Reported [SLOBODNY PIATOK 26 Feb] 11
- * Michal Movac's Political Profile Sketched [SLOBODNY PIATOK 26 Feb] 11

YUGOSLAVIA

Macedonia

- * Riot in Djorce Petrov Described, Analyzed 13
 - * Events Recounted [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 22 Feb] 13
 - * Reaction of Parties [VECER 22 Feb] 15
 - * 'Xenophobia,' Government Mistakes [PULS 25 Feb] 16
- Differing Opinions of Police Tactics [PULS 11 Feb] 18
- * Infrastructure, Ecological Problems Examined [VECER 6-7 Feb] 24
- * Ramifications of Power Plant Strike [PULS 4 Mar] 28

*** Prime Minister Klaus Views Czech Health Care**
93CH0480A Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech
12 Mar 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus for CESKY DENIK: "How To Privatize Our Health-Care System"]

[Text] In the transformation process in our country, health care occupies a specific position. On the one hand, it is an area we undoubtedly want to transform and an area for which we have great hope. On the other, we know that health care is something quite different from retail trade, services, or customary industry and that, therefore, the state must guarantee that the transformation process will not bring about a deterioration or a diminution of accessibility in terms of health care. It is precisely this that is very complicated, and that is why the transformation process, which was initiated by changing over to general health insurance and which is awaiting privatization, is still in its infancy. There is no need to fall victim to panic, but, at the same time, there is no need to unnecessarily defer the privatization of the health-care industry. Incidentally, its preparation is already in full swing, several thousand privatization projects have been submitted and evaluated, and a system of state financial support is in readiness that will make it possible for new acquirers of health-care facilities to acquire loans at lower interest rates (lower by as much as 8 percent compared to commercial rates).

In recent days, the government is in the process of working out a rational concept for privatization of health care itself and will gradually become more specific in that regard. Primarily, we rejected the idea of considering simple pseudoprivatization as a starting point—privatization that would call for the mass transfer of state health-care facilities to communities, and they would then merely rent those facilities to individual physicians. We are similarly disturbed by the so-called privatization of activities, which is similar to leaving health-care facilities in the hands of the state. We favor actual privatization of health-care facilities because that is the only definitive guarantee that health care will be economical and of the desired quality. (So that I am properly understood, that does not mean that we would completely exclude communities from participating in privatization. We do not wish, however, to provide them with any kind of advantage in the competition with private interests.)

One of the fundamental specifics involving the transformation of the health-care industry is the fact that, at the community level and in the regions, the basic and generally accessible health care must be preserved, and that must occur even in this transition period. From this, it is clear that acquirers—future owners of health-care facilities—must have certain limitations and duties outlined for them, either directly by law or through substantive burdens anchored within privatization projects and in the transfer agreements. At the same time, however, it is necessary to let the new owners have sufficient freedom of action for the so badly needed restructuring of health-care facilities and health-care activities because their current image and

structure is evidently not optimal. The whole idea is how to come to terms with those two quite contradictory requirements.

The key to structuralization of the problem is to understand and adopt as the starting point the fact that health-care facilities, in the majority of cases, have the standing of a local monopoly. And it does not so much depend on the character or the size of the actual health-care facility as much as it does on the specific conditions in the region. For example, a large hospital in Prague is exposed to greater competition than a small pharmacy that is the only one in a wide area.

In accordance with this criterion, we can then divide health-care facilities destined for privatization (not all of them will be destined for privatization!) into two groups with differing limitations prescribed for their acquirers. The first group will include those health-care facilities that do not have the position of a local monopoly and that, therefore, can be privatized more or less freely—the duties of their acquirers will include only the duty of concluding an agreement with the General Health Insurance Facility (by which we prevent their transformation into non-health-care facilities or into exclusive health-care facilities for rich paying patients), the duty to render certain specific services to the state (for example, the mandatory inoculation of children), and the duty of not discriminating against any individual or population group.

The second group will include health-care facilities that do occupy a position as local monopolies and whose privatization will therefore be restricted—their acquirers will have to continue providing health-care services within a certain stipulated structure, scope, and form. Those restrictions, which will be anchored directly in their privatization projects, will assure the population of a given community or region that privatization will not disrupt the provision of certain minimum necessary health care. It is precisely for that reason that privatization in the health-care sector will require somewhat greater oversight on the part of the state than privatization in other areas.

The principal responsibility for that oversight undoubtedly rests with the Ministry of Health, which will specify the concrete criteria for dividing health-care facilities into categories that are freely privatized and those subject to restricted privatization or possibly those that cannot be privatized at all. Okres health-care privatization commissions, which are familiar with specific conditions in their regions, will share in outlining the content of the substantive burdens imposed on restricted privatization so as to avoid a situation in which citizens in some regions might not be able to obtain basic health care. In some instances, that will require intervention into already processed privatization projects, but the fundamental concept is a given, and there is nothing to prevent the privatization process from beginning to acquire the necessary pace, even in the health-care industry.

*** Battek Discusses New CSSD Chairman**

93CH0480B Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech
10 Mar 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Rudolf Battek, chairman of the Association of Social Democrats, by Martin Danes; place and date not given: "Milos Zeman Shifted the CSSD (Czechoslovak Social Democracy) a Step Closer to the Communists"]

[Text] [Danes] More than two years ago, you were expelled from Czechoslovak Social Democracy; then, people from the reform-minded Rebirth Party entered it. This party has in this manner evidently shifted to the left. Do you feel that, after Zeman was elected chairman, the party took yet another step in the direction of the communists?

[Battek] It is relatively difficult at this time to judge the outcome of the fact that Zeman is the chairman, but, judging from external signs, one can speculate that this definitely shows that trend. Zeman is an accomplished pragmatist, who is fully guided by the anti-Klaus syndrome. For a democratic politician, it is, of course, a weakness if he defines his political position through his personal aversion to any one individual. It can be seen from the type of people he selected for his program team that he has no inhibitions. Such names as Mrs. Korinkova and Jiri Hajek, Milan Zeleny, and a number of others are no guarantee that he wants to create a new social democratic concept in the true sense of the word. There is the obvious danger here that Zeman, without any great moral scruples, will open the door to other former communists. He will certainly most likely not hesitate and will be capable of accepting even the Svoboda communists, provided they part company with the KSCM [Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia] and provided their vocabulary shifts to somewhat more acceptable positions. And, if that does not occur, they will be his closest allies in parliamentary decisionmaking.

[Danes] How do you evaluate the rocketlike ascendancy of Milos Zeman from the time of his entry into the CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democracy] last year until his election as chairman, as an individual who had espoused social democracy long before November?

[Battek] During this agitated postrevolutionary period, everything is virtually being established anew. The social democratic party cannot, understandably, keep pace with its old members, who are mostly over 60 years old. Without new people, the effectiveness and the influence of this party cannot be developed. But, if Petr Miller, who has been a member of the party for a few weeks, has the sky-high false self-awareness to run for the office of party chairman, this virtually reeks of lack of political judgment.

[Danes] Is the case similar to that of Zeman?

[Battek] Understandably so, but what helped Zeman is his intellectual "spark." That man has many gifts, even though many of them are negative. What is decisive is the extent to which Zeman will be capable of collaborating within the framework of social democracy with others.

[Danes] Do you believe he will be capable of doing that?

[Battek] I am not envious, and I would be glad if he proved capable of shifting to a substantive political platform; however, his boomlike shift to the left is actually a warning. I am no outright admirer of Klaus because I know that he has his weaknesses, but I will always rank among those who will be seeking a way toward a dialogue with all democratic forces.

[Danes] What do you think of Zeman's statement that the greatest danger to democracy stems from the ODS [Civic Democratic Party]?

[Battek] How could a democratic conservative party in a pluralistic system represent the greatest danger to democracy? These are somewhat intimidating words, which are intended to weaken the position of the competitor on the right at any price.

[Danes] You have good contacts among social democratic parties in West Europe. What are their reactions to the changes in the CSSD?

[Battek] One colleague, who is connected with the local Friedrich Ebert Foundation, told me that the reaction of West European social democracies will very likely be quite negative. Of course, to the extent to which I am familiar with them, the people there will overcome the situation, as they did many times in the past. They had no difficulty coming here before November and negotiating with the Bilaks and the Husaks. They received us dissidents then in some diplomatic villa that was obviously federally monitored. This is a certain natural political opportunism, which requires pragmatic politics to contact all those who share in power in any way.

[Danes] Do you believe that the CSSD could split apart?

[Battek] I spoke with a number of delegates at the CSSD congress, to which I accepted an invitation, even though I did not much want to attend. After Zeman was elected, some of them were asking me what they should do—whether they should turn in their party cards, leave the party, jump to the Association of Social Democrats (ASD), or what. To a certain extent, this development was predictable. As early as March 1990, I turned down the offered post of first deputy chairman of the CSSD because I saw the kind of people who were establishing social democracy in our country at the time. Half of them were communist agents who were preparing the establishment of this party even before November.

[Danes] What is the situation along those lines today?

[Battek] I have no doubt that the communists have their interest in the social democratic party; it is probably also certain that their undercurrents are working in it. I do not want to suspect the Zeman wing of such connections, but I can well imagine that there are many people there who would like to shift that party again into a position of some kind of democratic communism.

[Danes] As chairman of the ASD [Association of Social Democrats], did you establish any contacts after the congress with the Rakovnik stream or with the so-called moderates within the CSSD?

[Battek] The Rakovnik stream is an extremely inconsistent grouping. It includes such people as Valtr Komarek. There are also some of the old founders of the original concept of the historical compromise with the communists—a concept that was in prevalence in about November 1989. Those are people with whom I would not like to cooperate. But the present chairman of the parliamentary club of the CSSD, Karel Hrdy, feels himself to be part of the Rakovnik wing; he consulted me about the question of how to go on. I told those who got the feeling that they could not continue to exist within this party: Yes, come to us. I counseled the others who were hesitating to establish groups of Social Democrats that would be independent of the current leadership and to collaborate with our ASD.

[Danes] Do you not think that there is now an extraordinary opportunity for establishing a modern democratic opposition party?

[Battek] I am not certain how to establish such a party. For me, it would be a question of how to forge that party out of the ASD. It would probably require a sharp attack upon certain portions of the CSSD and the incitement of people to come and join us. I admit to you that my political instinct does not lead me to taking this sharp step. We lack the personnel and material prerequisites for it. In any event, however, I will continue the dispute regarding social democracy.

[Danes] By what method do you want to continue your dispute? Will the ASD change its political approaches?

[Battek] In the first place, the party must use sharper methods to penetrate the political scene and to recruit those who have a direct influence on political decision making for cooperation; that means recruiting people in parliament. We shall attempt to establish contacts with delegates.

[Danes] Do you see any possibility that some of the current delegates representing the CSSD might go over to your party?

[Battek] I am a little skeptical because that would signify the splintering of the parliamentary faction. I am not sure that there is a sufficient number of such delegates who might decide to take that serious and risky step. The ability to take political risks was, unfortunately, obviously not cultivated in them.

[Danes] But it is alleged that, within the parliamentary faction, there is more of an anti-Zeman sentiment....

[Battek] The chairman of the CSSD faction, Hrdy, told me that there is a slight tilt to the benefit of the anti-Zeman wing. But that can change. Not all of the delegates are sufficiently firm. They will be seeking their positions. Perhaps it is even our fault that we have not maintained

adequately close contacts with those people. The defection of some of the CSSD delegates to the ASD would be one way in which the struggle for an authentic social democratic party in this country could advance a step further.

[Danes] You know Mr. Lubos Dobrovsky well. Do you perceive any common characteristics between his actions before November and his political path after November?

[Battek] I know him, but not particularly personally. Although before November we cleaned display windows in an enterprise together, we were accompanied by others—by Miloslav Vlk, for example. I have no desire to touch Lubos Dobrovsky, but very few of those who were fully engaged in the reform-communist movement proved capable of parting company with him later. I know a few such people who are designated now by the others as simply traitors. People of that genetic code can simply not “stomp into the ground” that minimum of 20 years of wonderful political togetherness, their belief in the star of communism. That was not hypocrisy; all of those Kohouts, Lises, and so forth were 20 to 25 years old in those days—they really believed. Today, they continue being close and continue to support each other. The majority of them were expelled from the Communist Party; none of them left voluntarily. The majority of them also played the political waiting game; that is, they waited until there was a prospect again for prosecuting the idea of reform communism—an improved Prague Spring.

Despite the fact that I have a certain personal relationship with those people—after all, I was in contact with them for 20 years within the dissident movement—I can have nothing in common with them politically. Pictorially speaking, I could never be in the same party with Mr. Dubcek, Mr. Jicinsky, Mr. Silhan. Not even with Lada Lis, despite the fact that we liked each other because he was precisely one of the people who knew how to engage himself in the dissident movement. That cannot be forgotten. Except that even Petr Uhl was an extremely brave individual, and, even so, I cannot have anything in common with him in terms of politics today.

[Danes] Do you believe that Lubos Dobrovsky, as head of the Office of President of the Republic, will prove to be an impartial official in the manner visualized by President Havel?

[Battek] He will definitely prove able to stylize himself in that position, but, other than that, he remains who he is. He promoted his friend, the former communist Pavel Seifter, who also cleaned showcase windows with us, to the position of chief of the Foreign Section of the Office of President. I believe, however, that the president has the right to select whomever he wants for the office of chief of the presidential office. The fact that he chose precisely this man...well, I would have definitely chosen someone else. I would have chosen a person I could consider to be actually relatively above party politics, or I would have made my selection according to some completely different criteria. I would definitely not have selected a former communist.

*** Parliament Withdraws Agreement With Ukraine**
 93CH0489A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in
 Hungarian 11 Mar 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Csilla Medgyesi: "Parliament Will Not Be Deliberating the Agreement"]

[Text] Deputy Gyorgy Csoti (MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]), deputy chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, told reporters of MAGYAR HIRLAP and NEPSZABADSAG that deputies of the MDF had not requested the tabling of the bill for the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement's ratification. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that had withdrawn several bills, including the document in question. Csoti was responding to an interview that appeared in yesterday's issue of NEPSZAVA. The interview claimed that Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky was sharply attacked at the MDF caucus meeting last weekend, over a clause about the unalterability of the borders that was included in the agreement, and Deputy Istvan Halasz (MDF) even threatened personnel consequences if that clause was not deleted from the text.

Deputy Laszlo Kovacs (MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]) confirmed that parliament had not tabled the bill; rather, it had not placed the agreement's ratification on its calendar. To the knowledge of Deputy Istvan Szent-Ivanyi (SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]), no motion to amend the agreement was introduced, but that would not even have been possible in the case of an international document's ratification. The deputies agreed that it would be inconceivable for the legislature of one of the parties to a bilateral basic agreement to delete a sentence from the agreement. For the agreement to become effective, its text in both of the languages in question would have to be identical.

Legally the National Assembly has no other choice than either to ratify the agreement as it was concluded, and as Ukraine's legislative body has already ratified it, or not ratify it, Laszlo Kovacs emphasized. In case of modifying the text, the document would have to be renegotiated, and that could seriously damage Hungarian-Ukrainian relations. It would also rebound on the ethnic Hungarian minority living there; after all, Ukraine has already introduced a series of measures in the spirit of the agreement. Therefore the MSZP and the SZDSZ will support the basic agreement's ratification.

In response to the question as to whether the Foreign Affairs Committee had received any information about Romania citing the clause on the unalterability of the borders in the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement as a precedent, and insisting on the inclusion of a similar clause in the basic agreement to be concluded with Romania, Istvan Szent-Ivanyi said that the committee had not received any information for a year about the agreement to be concluded with Bucharest, and there had been hardly any progress in that matter since then. Anyhow, he added, the main point on which the two parties were unable to agree was not the unalterability of the borders, but the recognition of minority rights. The standpoint of the SZDSZ is that the approach to this question must be a flexible one. If a

compromise reflecting our interests can be reached in another area, we have to be flexible also on the question of borders. But if we are unable to make any progress on the situation of the minorities and on relations between our two countries, then conditions are not ripe for concluding a basic agreement, and we must not force the conclusion of one by all means. Gyogy Csoti also agreed with that conclusion.

According to Laszlo Kovacs, theoretically there are three ways in which the question of borders can be regulated in a basic agreement: according to the Helsinki formula, which bans the changing of borders by force; in a mutual declaration stating that neither party has territorial claims against the other; or in a mutual pledge that neither party will seek to change the borders, not even by peaceful means. In his opinion, however, under the present conditions it is not very realistic to expect changes, even through negotiations, in the borders between Hungary and its neighbors.

Szent-Ivanyi added that the Hungarian standpoint appears truly inconsistent when Hungary agrees on unalterable borders in its relations with one country, but refuses to do so in negotiations with other countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have thought this question through sooner and should have formulated a uniform strategy. Otherwise the ministry might lend substance to the unfounded libels that Hungary is fostering revisionistic aspirations.

Gyorgy Csoti was not present when the dispute erupted at the meeting of the MDF caucus, and therefore he was unable to give his assessment of the dispute. And he did not know of any other MDF deputies, besides Istvan Halasz, who were demanding personnel consequences in this matter.

*** Legal Proceedings Against Skinheads Begin**
 93CH0489B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in
 Hungarian 12 Mar 93 p 4

[MTI report: "Information Filed Against Skinheads"]

[Text] The Budapest Chief Prosecutor's Office has recently filed information against the juvenile defendant, Laszlo K., and his 10 codefendants, charging them with serial felony against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as defined in Section 156 of the Criminal Code. The first and second defendants in the case have been in custody on remand, since 19 August 1992. The prosecutor's office has established that the 11 juvenile skinheads—one of them a girl—assaulted E.B., a Zairian diplomat, because of the color of his skin, at around 2000 hours on 11 July 1992, in the vicinity of the Southern Railroad Terminal. On another occasion, specifically around 2000 hours on 8 August 1992, on Tanulo Street in Obuda, they assaulted A.H.A., a Yemeni diplomat, again because of the color of his skin. The Zairian diplomat's injuries healed in less than eight days; the Yemeni's, in 21 days. The case will be heard by the Budapest Court, acting as a juvenile court.

*** Viewer in Romania Praises Budapest's Duna TV**
93CH0439A Budapest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 25 Feb 93 p 9

[Article by Jozsef Gazda of Covasna County in Romania: "Duna TV as Seen in Sekler Land: Window to the Carpathian Basin"]

[Text] I am not exactly sure what ideas and goals had guided the creators of Duna TV, but I do not think that it would be too farfetched to say that since the invention and proliferation of the radio few events have affected the lives of Hungarians living a minority existence far from the mother country as profoundly as the afternoon of 24 December 1992, when at 1800 hours Central European time, Duna TV aired its first broadcast. At that moment it became theoretically possible for at least 1.5 million Hungarians to enter the realm of their national culture.

Today, in these modern times, radio alone could no longer make this possible, nor for that matter could television alone. The local accomplishments of the Hungarian minority must also be highlighted: the teaching of the mother tongue; the safeguarding, preservation, and expansion of our vitally important system of institutions; the accessibility of books, newspapers, periodicals—locally published, as well as materials brought in from Hungary—and a regionally relevant network of TV and radio stations that depict our own lives; and our ability to secure the right to freely foster our own growth. Of course, even Duna TV cannot produce miracles alone; it is not the pivotal factor in determining whether or not the Hungarian minorities living outside the borders of present day Hungary will survive, but it does make a difference. And this is something that program editors and broadcast profile designers must always keep in mind.

Far be it from me to want to give advice to anyone. For I am convinced that the people who have worked so hard to make this station a reality know very well what they are doing and why, even though they may have just started out. Still let me offer a few ideas here, for them as a "foreigner," and for us as a member of the "domestic" audience.

We expect this station to be informative. To inform us about current events, trends, international and Hungarian affairs, with particular attention to the life and struggle of the Hungarian minorities. We expect objective, undistorted reporting, a kind of window to the world, if you will, through which we are also seen as appropriate. Reporting that also deals with the lives of Hungarians living in the various detached territories so that we can learn more about one another, about the concerns, problems, struggles, and battles we are facing; our collective concerns and those phenomena that affect us all. And through these broadcasts we hope to strengthen our spiritual ties with the mother country, its problems, struggles, but also hopes. We expect programs that are imbued with the national spirit, which at the same time neither embellish nor gloss over the facts; which do not distort or mar the truth; and which aim not to discourage or repulse but to take a stand against negative

tendencies by reporting concerns, problems, and difficulties with sympathy and compassion.

In this respect, I feel, Duna TV does not need to strive to sculpt an exclusive profile. It must not make having a completely independent program its ultimate goal. By charting out and preserving its unique outlook and insight it must work to present the total picture. And that includes Hungarian life, culture, and news reporting as a whole, which it could cover by adopting some of the highly acclaimed and time-tested shows of Programs 1 and 2 of Hungarian Television (such as "Panorama," or the weekend sports summaries of events involving Hungary). In other words, it would not be a good idea to inundate us with sanitized programs of solely external interest. We would like to see the same things that all Hungarians have access to at any given moment.

I would also consider it important to continue, as it was originally planned, with the presentation of major Hungarian feature films. These could be complemented with televised broadcasts of outstanding theatrical performances from Budapest, but also from Kolozsvár [Cluj], Kassa [Kosice], and Sepsiszentgyorgy [Slintu Gheorghe]. We would like to be regularly exposed to the kind of cultural treasures that they have consistently and systematically isolated us from for four years, and to take part in the trends and movements from which we have so far been excluded.

Signed, Jozsef Gazda (Kovaszna) [Covasna]

*** 'Strike Atmosphere' at Paks Nuclear Power Plant**

93CH0489E Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Mar 93 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "A Strike Atmosphere at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant"]

[Text] A mood to strike is brewing at the nuclear power plant in Paks, it was revealed at the Autonomous Trade Unions' press conference yesterday. The reason is that Hungarian Power Plants (MVM) wants to abolish the low electricity rates to which its workers have been entitled up to now, said Rezso Gal, the delegate of the Electrical Industry Trade Unions. The normal rate is 5.40 forints per kilowatt, but the firms' 37,000 employees and 15,000 retirees have to pay merely 0.45 forint/kW.

MVM workers are protesting because they found out about the proposed decision only by accident, from an MTI report. So far, the firm has not even initiated talks with the trade unions representing the workers. On 5 March, the day after the news report appeared, the trade unions protested jointly and wrote letters to the ministers of industry, labor, and finance. On 9 March, at the talks on reconciling interests, the Ministry of Industry and Trade failed to provide an acceptable answer. On Tuesday the trade unions will be considering their further moves.

Dean Alexander, an aide to the president of OCAW, the Denver-based Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, said at the press conference that OCAW has sent a team over to strengthen ties with the Autonomous Trade Unions and would be giving the latter every possible support in the future. Incidentally, the leadership of the OCAW—it belongs to the AFL-CIO and has 100,000 enrolled members—does not agree with the statements made by Lane Kirkland, who visited Hungary last summer. Namely, the president of the AFL-CIO said that there were no genuine trade unions in Hungary, other than the League [Democratic League of Hungarian Trade Unions] and its affiliates.

The Americans not only want to exchange experience with their Hungarian colleagues, but are also helping them to set up an advisory system on how to handle conflicts at the workplace. They are ready to impart also such advice as *The Collection of Legal Tricks* that lists every lawful means for safeguarding interests at the workplace. Often this interesting collection recommends "opportunities to strike" by working strictly to rule.

*** AVU To Publicize Salable Properties**

93CH0511B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarianpk 18
Mar 93 p 9

[Unattributed article: "AVU To Organize Property Register; They Will Publicize Salable Partial Properties"]

[Text] The State Property Agency [AVU] is experimenting with new methods to accelerate privatization: A few weeks ago state enterprises not yet privatized, still under AVU supervision, received a questionnaire inquiring mainly about the progress they have made in preparing for privatization.

The other day another questionnaire was mailed to more or less the same, 400-plus enterprises. The purpose of the present survey is to assess the number and kind of physically independent parts of state enterprises that could be sold separately.

The AVU intends to establish a property register based on the responses. Most of the analysis of the enterprise data will be complete by the end of this month; at this time the AVU was unable to estimate the value of these partial enterprises. The AVU plans to computerize its property register, and to provide on-line access beginning in early April to small investors and others inquiring about privatization.

Clients will also be able to draw information from the property register in person. No decision has been reached as to whether this service will be provided free of charge or subject to the payment of a fee.

We were told that in addition to the 400 enterprises covered by the survey, corporations partly owned by the state will also receive questionnaires. By establishing a register for parts of property that can be sold with certainty, the AVU intends to provide information about the supply of privatized state property to Hungarian investors, i.e., small and medium-size entrepreneurs.

*** Poll Shows Political Preferences, Major Issues**

93EP0205A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 10,
7 March 93 p 24-25

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "The Curve of Fear: Pentor's Ranking of Politicians for WPROST"]

[Text] Every fourth Pole believes that Poland is ruled by secret agents; every third Pole is disoriented in this matter. This is the state of social moods. The need to find a scapegoat who can be burdened with the guilt for all of our misfortunes is still alive and brings hope to those politicians who want to take power by using slogans about clearing the country of agents. But these brave souls still have to work hard; as expressed in a survey ordered by WPROST and carried out by the Opinion and Market Research Institute PENTOR, the belief that agents are omnipresent does not mean automatic support for the advocates of such a view. Only Jan Olszewski, the leader of the Movement for the Third Republic, has the support of more or less all believers in agents. Meanwhile, neither Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Center Accord, nor Antoni Macierewicz, the leader of the Action Poland Movement, appeared on the list of the 20 most popular politicians. Support for their political groups also turned out to be very small. Maybe this is from an awareness that these politicians do not have a cure for the economy, while 63 percent of Poles put the threat of unemployment above the comeback of the communists or a dictatorship (of agents?). The fact that the Kaczynski and Olszewski circles limit themselves to political slogans does not promise them anything good, but it does explain the success of the Labor Union, which, until recently, was a marginal party on the political scene and now has third place in the party ranking.

The recently formed Labor Union seems to be quickly taking over the "electorate of the unsatisfied," which has lost its trust in those politicians who have tightly linked their calls to fight unemployment to the hunt for agents. A large number of Labor Union followers are probably also those who see clericalism as the greatest danger to Poland. This is probably the reason for the popularity of Zbigniew Bujak, the leader of the Movement for a Referendum; the real leader of the Labor Union, Ryszard Bugaj, cannot boast similar popularity. Mixing together a left-wing ideology with a call for state neutrality, the Union seems to leave behind other formations like the populist Confederation for an Independent Poland, and—a big surprise—the equally left and anticlerical Social Democracy of Polish Republic, whose leader, Aleksander Kwasniewski, went down on the ranking list.

On the top of the list remains Jacek Kuron, the minister of labor and social policy, for whom the results of this research are much less favorable than was the last poll. The loss of 10 whole points on the popularity chart probably came from a growing fear of unemployment; the scale of frustration revealed in the survey must be leveled at the chief of labor.

Hanna Suchocka trails Jacek Kuron by only 1 point, but she has also lost some popularity. Maybe this is the first result of the lack of a clear picture of the government's economic

policy, which wavers between workers' demands and entrepreneurs' goals, leaving neither satisfied.

President Lech Walesa lost precisely as many points as he gained in the survey last December. This has become the norm: The support for the president has for a long time varied within a few percentage points. This time, a new phase of the war on top, which culminated in the demonstration in front of the Belweder, could have harmed him. On one hand, Walesa already has a steady group of followers who believe that he should have more influence on public life; on the other, a majority of Poles is against strengthening his position. The same number of survey participants, 65 percent, does not want an increase of the influence of Mieczyslaw Wachowski, secretary of state in the Presidential Office. At the same time, in contrast to attitudes toward the head of state, trust in Wachowski's competence was expressed by only one-tenth of those surveyed. This finally eliminated the secretary of state from the list of 20 persons who, according to survey participants, should have more influence on the life of the country.

In the face of the general decline of trust in the whole political class, the only noticeable success fell to Marian Kraklewski, leader of Solidarity. While representing the moderate wing in his union, he skilfully ended the last wave of strikes, winning for himself the role of social peacemaker. But he pays for this with a lack of peace within Solidarity itself. The price could be even higher if it turns out that Krzaklewski also does not have a plan to limit the unemployment that causes more fear than all of the other threats put together. Once again, it turns out that the social consciousness is not determined by secret agents but by existence.

Greatest Dangers to Poland

- Unemployment, 63 percent
- Clericalization, 7 percent
- Anarchy, 5 percent
- Inflation, 5 percent
- Return of communism, 4 percent
- A buying out by foreign capital, 4 percent
- Influenced by foreigners, 2 percent
- War with another state, 2 percent
- Moral decline, 2 percent
- A halt to privatization, 1 percent
- Dictatorship, 0 percent
- Difficult to say, 0 percent
- Other, 1 percent

Election Preferences

Of those surveyed, 31 percent would not participate in an election, 3 percent refused to say, and 66 percent would take part.

The people say they would vote as follows:

- Democratic Union, 10 percent
- Polish Peasant Party, 6 percent
- Labor Union, 5 percent
- Confederation for an Independent Poland, 5 percent

- Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord, 4 percent
- Social Democracy of Polish Republic, 3 percent
- Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, 3 percent
- Solidarity '80, 3 percent
- Liberal-Democratic Congress, 3 percent
- Christian-National Union, 2 percent
- Movement for the Republic, 1 percent
- Center Accord, 0 percent
- Difficult to say, 21 percent

Is Poland Run by Agents?

- Yes, 24 percent
- No, 48 percent
- Do not know, 28 percent

Popularity of the 20 Top Politicians

- Jacek Kuron, 67 percent

- Hanna Suchocka, 66 percent
- Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 64 percent
- Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 50 percent
- Adam Michnik, 47 percent
- Waldemar Pawlak, 45 percent
- Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 38 percent
- Lech Walesa, 34 percent
- Bronislaw Geremek, 34 percent
- Leszek Balcerowicz, 30 percent
- Leszek Moczulski, 30 percent
- Marian Krzaklewski, 30 percent
- Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 25 percent
- Zbigniew Bujak, 25 percent
- Andrzej Olechowski, 24 percent
- Jan Olszewski, 23 percent
- Tadeusz Zielinski, 23 percent
- Ryszard Bugaj, 23 percent
- Donald Tusk, 20 percent
- Aleksander Kwasniewski, 20 percent

New Romanian Magazine Characterized as Racist

93P20116A Bucharest *BARICADA* in Romanian
23 Mar 93 p 15

[Article by Vlad Macri: "The Left Knows Indeed What the Right Is Doing!"]

[Text] France, the eternal model, has Le Pen. Italy has Mussolini. Romania, however, not satisfied with Vadim [Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Romania Mare Party president] has yet another night mare named Radu Sorescu. Our young Schickelgruber [Hitler's original name], after founding the National Right Party [PDN], exceeded his quota for 1993 by putting out, in addition, a magazine entitled THE NEW RIGHT.

And speaking of quotas, this is a good time to ask ourselves who indeed is behind Sorescu's unusually high productivity. The financial implications of this question should not be ignored. Instead of beginning with the Latin expression 'Who profits?', we will proceed more simply: Who, if anyone, does THE NEW RIGHT *not* insult? In the course of 16 pages chock full of repugnant statements just about everyone is insulted, from Fane Spoitoru's conationals [reference to Gypsies] to the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy to Vadim's toadies. The only person to escape the "order" promised by Mr. Sorescu is our beloved president, Ion Iliescu....

Things become a little clearer once one reflects on the immeasurable benefit that the PDN's demented racist statements bring to Cotroceni [presidential offices]. These statements would convince the ordinary Romanian that, compared to Sorescu, Iliescu is positively devoted to democracy and that no one is more European than the president. The connection is not at all impossible, because Marin Sorescu, the famous relative of our right-wing friend, is a fervent supporter of the president. The Left at Cotroceni knows perfectly well what the Right is up to and is even enjoying the fact that Corneliu Vadim Tudor no longer has the monopoly on animosity toward Romania's minorities—the Hungarians, the Gypsies, and the Jews.

The editorial in THE NEW RIGHT's first issue was penned by Radu Sorescu himself. After describing the Democratic Convention as "spineless" and "the living dead," Sorescu suggests an alternative to capitalism and communism, a third solution. This "solution" was expressed in language that is strangely similar to that used by Mr. Iliescu during his CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council] days, when he was fashioning an "original democracy" to Romanian specifications. Mr. Sorescu's formula indeed reminds me of the words of a politician from the Hungarian democratic opposition: "The third solution leads to the Third World." And how could it be otherwise, because the PDN's viewpoint manages to fold the ingredients for economic bankruptcy and institutional collapse into the morass of dictatorship and genocide.

The economic crisis is solved through "corporatism." Corporations, which are structures modeled on the archaic guild system, have a monopoly over each industry that employs them. For example, because Sorescu's Right

tickles the funnybone (at least at first), we may draw an amusing parallel to the group "Divertis": The corporation for small animal husbandry is the only one able to raise such creatures, "swindlers" are the only ones who "swindle," and so on. Corporatism "dissolves the class struggle," which is its justification. It matters little, doesn't it, that it also eliminates both competition and the market economy, because in the end it will annihilate everything. "The ethnocratic state" settles everything. All state positions are to be held only by "ethnically pure Romanians." But how many generations of ethnic purity does Mr. Sorescu require for a certificate of ethnic purity? Minorities that do not allow themselves to be assimilated are to be expelled. May other states with Romanian communities treat Romanians this way? This is a matter about which the great nationalist Sorescu demonstrates an astonishing indifference. Russians and Ukrainians in Romania are to sign a declaration acknowledging that the territory gobbled up by the Soviet empire belongs to Romania. Why should Romanian citizens of Russian ethnicity have to sign such a thing, what political relevance would this act have, and why doesn't Mr. Sorescu instead make Cotroceni's tenant [President Iliescu] ask Russia and Ukraine for this and many other absurdities?

Although in Sorescu's view "Africans have taken over trade in Romania," it is the Gypsies who stir his ire the most. But he takes care of them too: "As the final solution, the state will create reservations to isolate them." Let us be clear about this matter: No one should trivialize the serious social problems that this minority poses. But if Mr. Sorescu, who respects human rights about as much as I respect Stalin, cannot manage to understand this matter in human rights terms, he should try thinking in more realistic terms. He should at least draw a comparison to South Africa and see how its apartheid policy, which Sorescu now recommends to us so magnanimously, brought that country to the brink of disaster. Another staunch proponent of apartheid is Mr. Ion Luca, who believes that "Gypsies are a threat to society from the moment they are born," but who is too much of a coward to openly express the real meaning of his pathological ideas, namely, that Romanians must show "guile" and "radicalism." By radicalism he probably means "Let's get them by the throat," guile being what prevents him from saying that out loud.

Mr. Sorescu is conducting a merciless battle against human rights. His party published a proclamation whose main thrust would delight George Orwell: "The state is above everyone and everything.... Nothing can exist outside the state, and no one can be against the state.... Outside the state the individual is nothing, while in it he is almost everything.... At birth, individuals have no rights.... The phrase 'human rights' is nothing but a slogan for the cowardly and the weak."

There is no point discussing further the emphasis Sorescu places on the role of the state, as it is apparent that either he did not live in Romania before 1989, or did not get his fill of the "leadership role," in which case I recommend North Korea to him. As for his view of human rights, you have to

wonder how God ever gave Padu Sorescu the right everyone has at the moment of birth: the right to life.

Sorescu's most rabid attack, however, is directed against "the morass of democracy," which is said to be "against the people." Besides the painful dissertations on the system of universal suffrage authored by a certain Dan Iorgovan, who believes that democracy is bankrupt because "the voters do not know each other," we must note sadly the presence in the magazine of a man we respect, Ion Coja. In an otherwise well-written article, Coja arrives at such ridiculous conclusions as that technological progress is "form without substance" and states that the invention of penicillin and the saving of human lives mean "self-delusion."

Mr. Coja also believes that democracy is to blame for the murder of Jesus: Since when did the Sanhedrin [the supreme council and tribunal of the Jews], which ordered the Saviour's crucifixion, serve as an example of democracy? For the esteemed university professor the contradiction between the Right and the Left is best brought out in terms of the relationship between rights and duties: one

emphasizes the duties of the citizen, and the other that which the very same citizen deserves by virtue of the fact that he was born into a state of human beings and not Martians. But Mr. Coja, opposed as he is to "rights," believes, as we have seen, that rights must be earned through "heroism" in the service of the state and do not exist at birth. Mr. Coja, however, pretends not to see the contradiction between the PDN's endorsement of Christian morality and the elementary fact that Christian morality supports the Declaration of Human Rights. There is not only a right to life but also a duty to not commit murder, to love and help your neighbor, and to not shut him out just because his problems seem to you too great to overcome.

Finally, it is shocking to see how nonchallantly Mr. Sorescu levies charges against the very democracy that allows him to publish his magazine. What other political system tolerates a self-proclaimed enemy of that system and punishes him only through criticism, by allowing differing points of view? I wonder, if Sorescu's party were to come to power, would we ever be allowed to disagree with him?

*** Recent Czech Political Developments Reported**

93CH0445B Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
26 Feb 93 p 2

[Report by Marian Vanek: "News From Prague"]

[Text] Ever since the day when Vaclav Havel assumed the position of the first Czech president, Prague has been covered in smog, and the air has been unbreathable. But Prague citizens do not take this inauspicious situation symbolically and go out into the streets as little as possible. The conditions for dispersion are so poor that the Stranice crematorium stopped scattering the ashes of the deceased on the dispersal site. All of this is called "inversion." In Slovakia, there is a problem with arms conversion, and, in the Czech lands, they worry about inversion. Smog before me—smog behind me?

I read in the daily press that Prime Minister Klaus was inspired by the West, specifically by Great Britain, to which he recently paid a visit. There he is, sitting in the study at 10 Downing Street, talking with the British prime minister. All of a sudden, John Major looks at his watch and says: "Excuse me, but I have to go and see the queen." He got up and left. The Czech prime minister liked it so much that he decided to introduce this charming custom into the Czech environment. From now on, every Wednesday, shortly after noon, he looks at his watch and says: "Excuse me, gentlemen, but this is a matter of profound communication. I must go and see the queen. Pardon, I must go and see Vaclav!" He gets up and leaves. If Vaclav does not go to see Vaclav, then Vaclav must go to see Vaclav. Do you think that the two Vaclavs [Wenceslauses] will meet at the most appropriate location—that is, on St. Wenceslaus Square? Wrong, ladies and gentlemen! The Vaclavs will be meeting exclusively in Prague Castle!

But even before that, a delegation from a Romany petition committee visited the Czech prime minister and presented him with a petition. If, they said, their demands are not met, the Romanies will turn to civil disobedience. I admit that I was a little puzzled by this demand. It is obviously based on the premise that the Romanies' behavior thus far—that is, moving illegally into apartments and then wrecking them, stealing money, engaging in prostitution, and increasing criminality—is considered civil obedience. I therefore simply cannot imagine what their civil disobedience will look like. And, if that does not help, then the Romanies may even set up illegal fighting units. They do not have it easy, the Gypsies. The previous regime pampered them, and now, when they are asked to keep their behavior within the bounds of the law, they take it as a great injustice and are appealing to human rights.

The people living in Northern Bohemia who are not of Romany stock do not understand why their localities have been flooded with so many Romanies. It is their own fault! Allow me to explain: It is primarily because they put up the signs "Zimmer Frei [Room To Let]" and, under it, "Room" on houses everywhere. A so-so literate Romany reads it and immediately knows that they are offering free rooms (*Zimmer frei*) to Roms (Rooms). How simple it is! It

may be that it was fear of an emigration wave of Slovak Romanies to the Czech lands that led the Czech side to put such strong guard units along the borders. The Romanies are drawn to their president. The fact that two years ago Vaclav Havel visited a Romany festival in Brno and drank beer with them is bearing fruit....

CT 2 [Czech Television 2] is showing again, after a short pause, the report "What the Week Brought," with moderators Oto Cerny and Zuzana Bubilkova. Zuzana at first spoke in Czech, but P. Tigris took exception to that. That is understandable: He lived in the West longer than here. But Czech viewers want to hear only Czech from Japanese and Slovak television screens (Tesla-Ostrava). But, after a while, Zuzana began to speak in Slovak and was good. Members of the government in a boring discussion gave themselves mutual pats on the back for the meticulously planned currency separation. This is really extremely interesting: We are very successful at organizing actions in which things are demolished, dismantled, or divided. We are not successful at building, uniting, or consolidating. I also learned from this report that Vaclav Havel is getting ready to revive a tradition of President Masaryk. Every Friday he will meet informally with outstanding personalities. Even the name for this event will be the same as at the time of "father" Masaryk: "*patecnici* [Friday People]." (Or maybe "*zpatecnici* [reactionaries].") I really do not know now; I was not paying attention.)

*** Michal Kovac's Political Profile Sketched**

93CH0445A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
26 Feb 93 p 1

[Commentary by Stefan Sugar: "Citizens' President?"]

[Text] Many people felt relieved when, with a convincing majority, the National Council of the Slovak Republic elected Michal Kovac as president of the Slovak Republic. People felt relieved most of all because they were afraid that, after the unsuccessful election of Roman Kovac, the same farce will take place in the SR National Council that we witnessed during the many unsuccessful attempts to elect a president of the Czech and Slovak Republic and during the scandalous election of the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. People also noted with relief the fact that the election of the president proceeded in a dignified manner and that, despite some lapses in protocol, it manifested high political culture. People therefore at last lived to see an event that did not make us fall into yet another political subbasement, an event that did not contribute to a further, well-nigh unbearable escalation of internal political tensions.

The representatives of political parties and movements should take note of this feeling of relief on the part of our citizens because it expresses a tremendous desire for a turnaround, for a stabilization of the political and economic situation, for action that will at last lead to the overcoming of the chaos and infamous improvisations in the restructuring of the political system, the economy, and the state. The citizens have already come to realize that they are merely a card in the game of the political virtuosos.

which they hand over to them every four years in the elections, but that otherwise their influence on politics and on the course of political processes is almost zero.

At a time when the citizen becomes aware of his powerlessness and sees how society's energy is dissipated in the warfare among the political parties and miniparties or groupings, the newly elected President Michal Kovac comes with the proposition that he wants to be an integrating personality and that he wants to be the president of all of the citizens. It is, I think, a splendid idea because it is high time to stop the unending process of constant splitting and dividing into ever smaller units, until one day we shall all be everyone against everyone. Not only the fear of further escalation—often artificially induced—of the tension between national minorities and the new state, but also the currently under-way splitting of Slovak society into the federalists and the nationalists cause serious uneasiness. This program of integrating all Slovak citizens seems to me at this time to be the most important nation-building idea, guaranteeing democracy and the stability of the young state. It contains a lesson the Slovak Republic learned from the fate of Austria-Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia—that is, state units that did not manage to respect the rights and aspirations of all of their citizens. Therefore, tolerance! But along with it also an interest in building a prosperous state because nothing undermines the stability of a state more than an economic breakdown and poverty. It was precisely for this reason that the two most terrible totalitarian regimes of our century, German Nazism and Soviet Stalinism, found a fertile ground in which to grow.

It will not be an easy task to unite all citizens and their often contradictory group interests. For a president with such a mission we could hardly have found a more suitable personality than Michal Kovac. After all, he already proved his ability to soften hard party positions in his function as chairman of the Federal Assembly, which, under his leadership, succeeded in carrying out the division of the state in a civilized manner. To unite what at first glance appears

impossible to unite, Michal Kovac already managed more than once. We shall also follow with confidence his appearances on the international scene, and we shall not stand in fear that he will make a misstep. On the contrary, we shall be concerned lest he finds himself, because of his moderation and his endeavor to achieve harmony, in conflict with his duty to use his presidential authority to force the political powers in the government and the parliament to pass such laws that will be precisely in the interest of the citizens whose president he has become.

Many politicians and journalists express doubts that Michal Kovac will succeed in cutting the umbilical cord to the movement that nominated him for president. His commitment and program to be an integrating president of all citizens absolutely obliges him to do that. In this connection, it seems appropriate to remind ourselves of the fate of Thomas a Becket, a close friend of King Henry II of England, on which J. Anouilh based his play of the same name. The English king named his confidant to the highest position in the Church of England in order to bring it under his control. The outcome of this step was the exact opposite of what he expected because Thomas a Becket identified with his mission to protect the interests of the Church of England to such an extent that he became the greatest adversary of the English king. Thomas a Becket had to accept the role of defender of the Church of England, which was stronger than the role of the intimate confidant and friend of the English king.

If Michal Kovac accepts his political role, which stems from the function of the president of the Slovak Republic, there will be no doubt about what kind of politics he will pursue. And, finally, Michal Kovac is not indebted to his movement for his position all that much because he gained it largely thanks to a consensus with the other parties. But it is most important that he does not follow their politics, either, but the politics of all of the citizens. If he does that, he can become not only a political, but also a charismatic personality.

Macedonia

* Riot in Djorce Petrov Described, Analyzed

* Events Recounted

93BA0714A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 22 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by V. Jovanovski, M. Anastasova, and Z. Petrov:
"Neither the Government nor the Citizens Are Yielding"]

[Text] Yesterday the police helped secure the site where a
refugee camp is being built. Several thousand citizens have
blocked the main artery and the bridge across the Saraj to
prevent any eventual arrival of police patrols from Tetovo.
Disturbances continued during the night.

The protest (which started on Friday) by the residents of
the Djorce Petrov settlement in Skopje against the building
of a refugee camp assumed serious and undesirable dimen-
sions over the past two days (and nights). This was mainly
because the event developed into a clash between the
citizens, on the one hand, and the police, on the other, for
the latter's task was to ensure the building of this contro-
versial project. Darkness did not quiet down the excited
spirits, and the disturbances continued throughout Sat-
urday night, immediately after the end of the TV news
program, when the crowd of citizens once again took to the
main street.

According to the demonstrators, two days ago, at about
2100, without any provocation, the police used tear gas
against them, after which they began to deal physically with
the massed people. Furthermore, according to eyewit-
nesses, during the night MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs]
personnel entered homes, private residences, and garages
and began beating up the citizens with their clubs.

In the course of yesterday as well, the situation in the
Djorce Petrov settlement did not substantially change. At
about 1000, according to Slobodan Sekuloski, several
policemen entered the "Jovan" grocery store (located on
the main street) and threw a smoke bomb inside, although
there were customers, mainly women, in the store. In proof
of this statement, Sekuloski produced the smoke bomb.
Furthermore, he said, subsequently the police expressed
their anger at the fruit and vegetable store on the opposite
side of the street by breaking its windows.

Around 1140, a truck showed up on the main street, with
Ivangrad plates, hauling construction materials. The crowd,
in the belief that materials were being hauled for building
the controversial project, stopped the truck, removed the
driver from the cab, and blocked the street with the vehicle.
This way, once again, the crowd stopped the traffic that,
although already obstructed with overturned garbage pails
littering the streets, nevertheless somehow moved. In
answer, and with a view to keeping the way clear, the police
appeared from the direction of "Voena Ekonomija" with
water cannons, to which the citizens reacted with rocks.
Immediately after that the water cannons were pulled back.

This sort of "war" went on, with tear gas used repeatedly
throughout the day yesterday, the effect of which was felt in
the air for some time—unpleasant smell and irritation of
the eyes and the throat. Several people could be seen
wearing protective masks or covering their mouths with
their shawls. However, the use of this chemical did not
succeed in dispersing the crowd, which after being cleared
once again returned, ever more firmly opposing the police
and the police methods.

At around 1230 the situation at the "Voena Ekonomija"
site of the dispute began to quiet down, although the
disturbances continued in the vicinity of the "Mirce Acev"
butcher's shop. Repeatedly police vehicles, the familiar
"Marica," rolled down the street in an effort to clear the
demonstrators and the barricades consisting of overturned
garbage containers. However, they retreated quite rapidly
under a hail of rocks. Unable to regain control, the MVR
personnel changed their tactics, and at 1300 hours a line of
policemen appeared from the Djorce Petrov market site
advancing to the area of the disturbances, toward "Voena
Ekonomija," again with a view to dispersing the crowd.
Half an hour later, the order was issued for the citizens to
disperse, threatening the use of force should they fail to do
so. In response, the rebellious citizens approached the
police line and the police began to retreat toward the
controversial site.

Several members of the opposition in the Assembly were
seen at the site. Among others, talking to the citizens was
Vladimir Golubovski (VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party]). In his
statement to NOVA MAKEDONIJA, he said that this
incident is a tragic misunderstanding, triggered by the
irresponsible attitude of the government, which is following
the irrational political ideas of the president of the
Republic. These actions, he went on to say, unnecessarily
encouraged the rioting of the population at the Djorce
Petrov settlement. Actually, Golubovski said, this step
taken by the government follows the policy of successive
concessions made to the minorities. In this specific case,
based on questionable political reasons, the gates are being
opened to the Islamization of Macedonia. "There is a
specific danger for the Djorce Petrov settlement to become
something like the Bronx," Golubovski said, "for which
reason the government must immediately halt construc-
tion."

A similar thought was expressed by Dosta Dimovska
(VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National
Unity]), who also believes that this is an unnecessary
provocation by the government. "The construction must be
stopped, for it is illegal. There is no need for it and it is not
part of the urbanization plan. Our party lays the responsi-
bility to Ministers Antoni Pesev and Ljubomir Frckovski,
and demands an explanation for their use of force against
the citizens. We asked to meet with Frckovski and with the
prime minister but they could not be located. Meantime,
Representative Mitko Anastasovski spoke on the telephone

with President Kiro Gligorov, who said that the police will be withdrawn and the construction will be stopped," Dimovska said.

It has been claimed that this was a deliberate provocation with a view to triggering the riots, said Dragi Ivanovski (MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action]). He believes that the construction of this controversial project should wait until the Constitutional Court had issued a ruling, a request for which has already been filed, challenging the resolution of the government. Furthermore, he added, the citizens must be told the truth about changes in the plan. The police, as was the case in Kuklis, Radolista, Radovis, and Bit Pazar, are put in the uncomfortable position of having to defend the government and its anti-constitutional resolution of building this project. In this case, Ivanovski said, instead of looking for the proper ways for solving existing urban problem, force is being used as part of the scenario of destabilizing the political situation in Macedonia. This is being repeatedly used, and all of this is taking place on the eve of important international meetings on which the future of the Republic depends.

The presence of representatives of political parties was approved by some of the citizens, providing them with the opportunity for giving them their version of the truth. Others were indignant, asking them "where were you yesterday," accompanied by booing and remarks such as "do not let them manipulate us." Among others, also present at the settlement were Mihail Panovski (Ilinden—Free Democrats) and Mayor Goran Nikolovski, accompanied by Eftim Takovski. However, their appearance did not help the situation, for the citizens continued to remain on the street, expressing their objections and opposition. There were shouts asking for representatives of the government to come to the site, but no one came.

A great deal of damage was done during these three days, said a resident of Djorce Petrov, who wanted to remain anonymous, adding that, actually, people were hurting themselves because the street is wrecked and the containers that were already in short supply have now been totally wrecked. However, she emphasized, there is no way to retreat, for the construction of this project will bring insecurity. For that reason, she believes, all citizens of the Republic should support the Djorce Petrov population. As to the use of force, this anonymous citizen asked, "What kind of government and police are these who act against their own people, hitting their own brothers and sisters?"

During that period (between 1400 and 1500 hours) the situation could be rated as relatively peaceful, although a high percentage of the settlement's population remained on the street, which the MVR forces tried to control. Some time around 1500 hours, however, the citizens reorganized themselves, and once again blocked the bridge on the Saraj, aiming, according to them, at preventing any eventual arrival of more police patrols from Tetovo. Another group remained close to the "Voena Ekonomija" site.

Subsequently, in the course of the day, nothing significant occurred and no serious incidents were noted. At 1700 hours the police were withdrawn, while the number of

citizens on the street kept increasing. Thus, one could generally estimate that it was a crowd of more than 1,000 residents of the settlement. They unanimously said that they would not abandon the terrain until the decision to build a refugee camp had been revoked. As to what happened during the past few days in the Djorce Petrov settlement, a brief commentary was provided by one of the citizens: "They are hitting and we are hitting back."

[Box, p 3]

"The Construction Will Go On"

Statement by Ministers Antoni Pesev and Ljubomir Frckovski

Relative to further developments in the construction of the refugee camp, Minister Antoni Pesev issued the following statement:

This is a matter of an entirely legal resolution issued by the government of the Republic of Macedonia. According to Article 64, the government has the right to make independent resolutions and, according to the same article, a number of resolutions have been passed in the Republic, most of them about Skopje.

The government has little scope for action. This is a question of legal procedure, and of a resolution passed according to the law. We are not in a position to abrogate a resolution on building the project: There is a financing authority, there are signers to the protocol, and we cannot take such action unilaterally. In that case we would be breaking the law. This would be unconstitutional. It is those who promote the implementation of this project that have demanded protection for doing the work.

The police must remain at the project site, and all of us together must equally share in the difficulty of this situation. In any case, there should be no illusions whatsoever that, if attacked, the police will not return. The police will intervene; there is no argument on this point. Nothing will change until the government changes its position.

Expressing his views on the situation and the intervention of the police, Minister Frckovski said:

The police always get the thick end of the stick. Three policemen have been hurt more severely: one had his leg broken, the second was hit on the head, and the third had teeth broken. This is a situation about which it is difficult to comment in advance whether the police exceeded its powers. The job of the police is to ensure the uninterrupted work of the construction workers. It is not there to use force against the citizens. Furthermore, that property belongs to the state; no one has the right to attack the workers, and the law of the street cannot stop our work. Something else is interesting that we know how to recognize: Racism and fascism, as we have seen in Germany and in Austria, must not come to our country. This is a sinister situation: It is being said that these are people who do not deserve to be our neighbors. Such people could not have anticipated their own future. This is a question of a loss of reason, an attempt

at aggression which frightens all of us. I refuse to believe that we live in a country with such political features, Minister Frckovski added.

[Box, p 3]

Eight People Hurt

Eight people were hurt in the incident that occurred at the Djorce Petrov settlement yesterday and the day before. According to information provided by the physician on duty at the Djorce Petrov polyclinic, which is in the immediate vicinity of the site of the events, two days ago medical assistance was provided to one member of the MVR, who was hit on the head with a rock and who, after treatment, was sent home to recover. In the course of yesterday, six citizens and one fireman went to the polyclinic for help. They suffered bodily injuries from chemicals and dull objects. After treatment they too were released.

We were told at the city general hospital and the clinic of the UCMN [expansion unknown] that they did not have a single case of injury from the riots in front of and in the vicinity of the area of "Voena Ekonomija" in the Djorce Petrov settlement.

[Box, p 3]

The Trouble Is Escalating While the Authorities Remain Silent

For three days, riots and fighting between the population of the Djorce Petrov settlement in Skopje and the police have been escalating. The reason seems trite: The building of a refugee camp threatens to turn into a major political problem, with all possible repercussions affecting peace and security in the Republic—tear gas, clubs, rocks, bludgeoning, bloodied heads, broken ribs, and a very great deal of anger against the authorities, this being only part of the atmosphere that prevailed during the past three days in that Skopje settlement, with garbage containers turned over and set as barricades on the street and garbage and rocks scattered, making it look like a real battlefield. Unanimously the citizens claimed that this was a put-up job by the government, which without informing them or seeking their agreement gave its permission to build housing in the center of the settlement, for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, mostly Muslims, and that the claim that it will be used to resettle Macedonians who had escaped from that Republic was nothing but a lie. In any case, regardless of how right the actions of the population may be, it is obvious that it does not intend to give up its intentions and to prevent by all possible means the bringing of building machinery to the site. On the other hand, as in similar cases in the past, the police find themselves in a situation of having to settle political or communal problems, although the police range of authority and ways and means of action are very well known.

Characteristic of the past three days at the Djorce Petrov settlement is the stubborn silence maintained by the respective state structures, despite the alarming news that both

police and citizens were hurt. It is logical, in such a situation, that some political parties that do not participate in the government and that have benefitted from the lost political opportunities of the government would profit. In such an unnaturally created situation, somehow the destructive effect of disinformation and half-truths has become apparent. Its purpose is to create as much chaos and disorder as possible around a minor problem, making it a political one, with all possible implications concerning the stability of Macedonia. What makes this problem even more absurd is that not a single state leader or official has sought to discuss the situation with the citizens, while Prime Minister Crvenkovski and Ministers Peshev and Frckovski, whose names have been most frequently mentioned by the demonstrators, did not deem it necessary to issue any communication to the public. In general, the government did not deem it necessary to discuss this matter. Apparently, the issue will have to be resolved by the police and the citizens alone, with their own typical methods, as was the case in the past few days.

Will someone have to become a casualty before the gravity of the problem in the Djorce Petrov settlement begins to be viewed in its entire seriousness? There are "good" reasons to believe this, for the latest events indicate that the number of demonstrators is steadily growing, their ranks being inflated by citizens coming from other settlements.

*** Reaction of Parties**

93BA0714B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 22 Feb 93
p 5

[Unattributed report on party reactions to the Djorce Petrov events: "The Government Does Not Dare To Break the Laws"]

[Text] VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]: Regarding the events at the Djorce Petrov settlement in Skopje, the VMRO-DPMNE expresses its astonishment at the extremely repressive actions of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] personnel and the violation of the legal norms by Minister Antoni Peshev, most openly harming the life and destinies of the Macedonian people.

The VMRO-DPMNE believes that the perfidious game played by the government, which in order to build this Muslim camp has already taken and spent the money from Northern Westphalia, conceals a step with which it would like increasingly to Islamize the main city of the Republic of Macedonia.

For these two reasons, the VMRO-DPMNE calls upon the government of the Republic of Macedonia to repeal this illegal resolution within 24 hours; conversely, within the shortest possible time Ministers Peshev and Frckovski should resign as a result of such delinquencies.

Ilinden-Free Democrats: The conflict between the population and the police in the Djorce Petrov settlement is the result of the contradictory nature of two actions: one

legitimate, as represented in the detailed urban development plan, and the other illegal, consisting of the hasty resolution by the government to build a refugee camp, the Ilinden-Free Democrats press conference stated yesterday.

According to that party, the people's rebellion is not against the state or of a divisive nature but is an expression of the threat facing its vital interests and is aimed against the illegal decision made by the government. If we want to have a democracy, it was stated, the government should revoke and revise its resolution.

MAAK: The Movement for All-Macedonian Action [MAAK] most sharply objects to the brutal behavior and physical actions of the police against the Macedonian people in the Djorce Petrov settlement near Skopje. The people justifiably reacted in an effort to block the further Islamization of the Macedonian state. Once again MAAK notes that the Macedonian police were put in the denigrating position of having to defend the communist-Albanian coalition government against the people who clearly did not accept the anticonstitutional actions of the already fallen government.

League for Democracy: A state that claims to be law-governed, reads the announcement by the League for Democracy, should in no case allow the breaking of the laws and urban development plans by anyone and, particularly, by the government, whose main task is to ensure the implementation of the laws and not to violate them.

We are astonished by the fact that in Skopje there has been a tremendous opposition to building a top-quality hotel such as the Sheraton, whereas no one reacts to building a camp for refugees although this violates the urban development plan.

Workers Party: The Workers Party calls upon the authorities to shed complete light on this incident and to prevent any further confrontation; the dispute between the citizens and the police should prove one more time that the problem and the solution do not lie in the settling of accounts between the parties but in the bad decisions made by the authorities, resulting in such undesirable confrontations.

VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party]: The VMRO-DP blames for this governmental action above all the president of the Republic of Macedonia who has pursued for quite a long time an antinational policy that has opened the gates to the Islamization of Macedonia. For that reason, we demand the collective resignation of the government and ahead-of-schedule presidential elections.

* 'Xenophobia,' Government Mistakes

93BA0714C Skopje PULS in Macedonian 25 Feb 93
pp 10-11

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovski: "Good Morning, Xenophobia"]

[Text] *The idea of turning an anonymous little village that could previously be reached by train from Skopje into a world-famous site was implemented in its entirety. Information on the riots at "Djorce" during the week was the second most important news item broadcast by CNN, immediately after news from Sarajevo.*

I do not wish to brag, but "we in Djorce...have always been good fighters." It was thus that a 20-year-old boy from the Djorce Petrov settlement in Skopje, weighing slightly more than 50 kg, boasted that their district would defeat the national police in the struggle for defense against Islam. It must be acknowledged that, as far as the quality of the "brawlers" was concerned, the three-day weekend war triggered by the building of a camp for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in that Skopje district, convinced us of the truth of that statement. In the course of fighting the police, the people of Djorce Petrov displayed an enviable level of endurance that, at times, bordered on fanaticism ("brother, I am not afraid to fight. If necessary I will die, but Muslims and Gypsies will not come here as long as I live"). Age and sex were absolutely no obstacle to participation in the demonstrations. The older people usually took care of the "rational" component ("Children, turn over the containers but do not break them. Tomorrow we shall be dumping our trash in them"), while the women were in charge of keeping up the heat of the crowd, exultantly raising their arms to the sky and pleading for the salvation of Macedonia.

Nonetheless, the leading positions were held by the young. They became so involved in the struggle for the "liberation" of their street that they were taunting the police to come and settle their accounts. Naturally, one should not think that the police yielded to the challenge of the demonstrators easily. This was convincingly proved on Saturday night when, according to the people, they fiercely charged the participants in the riots. Some of those who bore the marks of police clubs, as we saw personally, claimed that "fuzz" even entered the houses of the people, dragging suspicious characters out and, using rubber truncheons, proved to them outside in the courtyards who was right. So far, the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has not denied such statements.

Otherwise, in the course of the latest rebellion of the semiurban "guerrilla" in Djorce Petrov, a number of details could be noted providing an additional dimension to the entire event that went somewhat beyond the pretext of building a camp for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, in the course of the three-day "popular events," new musical compositions were being broadcast uninterrupted from the building opposite the disputed site, retransmitted from the Radio Ros program. In addition to its soothing function, such music clearly depicted the aesthetic tastes of most of the demonstrators. Many of them, in the lull between two fights, yielded to the seducing sounds of the folk melodies, propping their morale with swigs of brandy from their pocket flasks. At one point, the most spirited among them started dancing "Macedonian dances" and singing "Macedonian songs."

Another interesting aspect was their favorable view, not to say their total approval, of the policy that is being pursued by the Serbian regime in Kosovo ("only Milosevic can deal with the Albanians"). Furthermore, the local population, a significant percentage of which comes from western Macedonia, mainly from the Tetovo area, views the Albanians as people quite different from themselves, in the negative meaning of the term, naturally, for which reason they were not inspired in the least by the "concessions" made to the Albanians by the Macedonian leadership. On this basis, bearing in mind the religious component, the impatience of the people of Djorce Petrov with the Muslims, not only those of Bosnia, but all Muslims in the world, was ideally linked. They believe that the supporters of the Islamic faith are "unclean," "aggressive," and "tending to multiply in a geometric progression," and that, if allowed to settle in Macedonia, where "one day they will become the majority," they will "melt us," "become members of parliament," and so on. This set of views is by no means limited to Djorce Petrov or to Skopje, from the various districts of which "reinforcements" kept arriving. This was a situation almost identical to the one in Prilep....

At least according to the talk that could be heard during the riots last weekend, the angered citizens of this western Skopje suburb also displayed a specific view on democracy that, again, is not one of their specific characteristics. They consider this term in the literal meaning of the word as rule by the people, for which reason they could not comprehend in the least how it was that the police that should defend the people were just then were mistreating them the most. Their logic was as follows: If in a Macedonian state the police are Macedonian how do they dare to beat Macedonians up?

This entire disjointed outlook also includes the view according to which this district is a surrounded or target microcosm ("Djorce Country!"); anyone who comes from the outside is a foreigner and, according to the rules of xenophobia, disturbs the idyllic atmosphere in the settlement. That is probably why the United Nations forces themselves, not realizing what it was all about, could not understand why they were being stoned by the people while crossing Djorce Petrov.

Be that as it may, the intent of turning an anonymous little settlement, reached from Skopje by train, into a worldwide famous site was fully implemented. The news of the riots in "Djorce" this past week was the second most important item broadcast by CNN, immediately after news from Sarajevo. The local citizenry was probably pleased even further by the ruling of the Constitutional Court on halting construction work at the site until a final decision has been reached on the legality of the government's resolution to build a refugee camp. It is even claimed that this controversial resolution has already been abandoned, for Article 54 of the Law on Spatial and Urban Planning, to which the government referred, applies only to sites for which there is no detailed urban development plan, while in the case of this site such a plan already exists.

Regardless of the eventual outcome and the legal tangle, the attitude of the Djorce Petrov demonstrators or, in other

words, our neighbors, could not be considered only from the urban development, legal, or economic aspects: The "Rostok" syndrome, which was so clearly manifested during the riots, goes much deeper and is more frightening!

[Box, p 11]

Where the State Went Wrong

The state machinery did not display even the slightest wish to listen or show any sensitivity to the heterogeneous interests of the population. Under circumstances of national and social stress, this becomes a special problem.

A law-governed state is not introduced by declaration and acclamation. A law-governed state is developed as a socio-historically determined form of expressing, organizing, streamlining, and defending freedom in relations among people. It truly comes to being as a result of the combination among new social institutions.

Were the Djorce Petrov events a manifestation of the law-governed state in action?

The state must clearly formulate a resolution, as it did (as well as a second, and a third). It defended it with the power given to it by the overall apparatus of the state and of state coercion. Let us try to find a law-governed state in all this.

The law-governed state implies the following:

1. Proper information. It is only accurate and full information that could become the basis for satisfying the basic need of the people in the modern world: the need to control their own lives and determine their own destiny. The democratic foundation of the legitimacy of laws is provided precisely by the common will and despite the seeming slowness and relative inefficiency during some short periods of time the fact remains that power based on agreement is superior to a power imposed by force. This is the starting prerequisite on which an apparently democratic state is based.

2. The law-governed state implies compromise decisions that contain a great deal of professionalism, a detailed study of the issue, and the use of specialists (since it originates in the state, it should be the legal confirmation of actually existing relations or the clearly manifested interests of the citizens).

3. Democracy becomes part of the law-governed state after the principle that the state authorities must not violate their own laws (in the most formal meaning of this term) has been mastered. Actually, what happened? The state apparatus informed the public of the nature of its resolution in a very chaotic, partial, and inconsistent manner (indicating the absence of a law-governed state).

The state apparatus did not even minimally listen to or show any sensitivity concerning the heterogeneous interests of the population. Under the conditions of a national and social stress this becomes a separate problem (indicating the absence of a law-governed state).

The state apparatus operated outside the context of the overall regulatory laws, and abused its emergency powers that apply to exceptional situations and must be, above all, a function of defending the interests of the citizens (indicating the absence of a law-governed state).

There is no law-governed state but there is a shifting of the focal point of the main purpose of the law-governed state (establishing the greater and guaranteed freedom of the citizens), reducing it to the following:

- Constitutional obedience (bow your head and keep silent until they crush you);
- Restricting freedom for the sake of achieving some higher state objectives (the people "above" always know better what you need);
- Increased exceptional powers of the state (if the people do not agree with your resolutions hit the people in the hope that they will gain a better understanding).

By depriving them of a law-governed state and making it impossible for the citizens to act through regular political channels and the channels of local self-government, the government forces them to resort to civil disobedience and take to the streets.

Under such circumstances of exceptional tension, the easiest thing is to avoid any responsibility whatsoever with bombastic statements of major (and most frequently false) humanism, above all humanism at the expense of someone else.

Perhaps someone should remind us that the idea of building a democracy without a people is, in general, not a new idea but also that it regularly ends in something which even with the best possible wish could not be described as anything other than a dictatorship. And that even the best political resolutions could fail if their purpose is not explained and if an effort is made to impose them by force.

—Mirjana Najcevska

Differing Opinions of Police Tactics

93BA0644A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 11 Feb 93
pp 10-12, 33

[Article by Dzabir Derala: "Days of the Long Nightsticks"]

[Text] *Hidden behind a veil of secrecy, still distant from broader publicity from political parties as well, an incident is being cooked up that is even bigger than the former "group of eight" and all the previous scandals and miniscandals.*

In recent weeks, the Macedonian police have become a hot topic, not just among political parties or citizens, but also beyond that; they have become a subject of discussions in the Assembly, in working groups, and in survey commissions that have been formed in order to investigate the police's lawful conduct in all cases in which a mass gathering of citizens for various reasons has ended with night-clubs, with tear gas, or with lost lives. In times like those we are living through, i.e., chaotic and uncertain, and which are rather euphemistically called transitional, the police are

sharing the fate of all other state institutions, but the divisions in them and around them, precisely because of the real power that they possess, are making them of interest for public observation. And even if the police or their leading structures are providing a reason for such heightened observation, as is the case with the Macedonian police, then it really is time to raise certain dilemmas, publicly and responsibly. One of them is whether the widespread opinion is true that the state, slowly but surely, is on the way toward becoming a police state, or whether the increased presence of the police in public life is due mainly to the complexity of the transitional period.

If we judge by public opinion, voiced in numerous polls, including the results of a Gallup poll, as well as the poll that PULS conducted for this occasion, the police are even well ranked among citizens, and the results of these studies indicate the opposite of what is being claimed by reporters and political parties. In fact, the results obtained indicate that most of those polled think that the police are acting within the limits of their legal authority and that they, the citizens, feel safe with such police. On the other hand, more well-informed circles, the so-called qualified public, know more about the other side of the police as well. That "private life" of this body is anything but idyllic and harmonious. For two months now, information has been received about a new wave of purges in the police, namely this time in the State Security Service [SDB]. Hidden behind a veil of secrecy, and still distant from broader publicity from the political parties, an incident is apparently being cooked up that is even bigger than the former one of the "group of eight" and all the previous scandals and miniscandals. This new one apparently, when it bursts, will reveal all the hidden political, but also party, maneuvers to take police authority into their own hands, regardless of whose they will be.

In the search for truth, it happens that one proceeds from previously outlined assumptions. It often happens that one is wrong, even if the intentions are good and noble. Moreover, the truth is never unique. Anyone can make a mistake, even if he is right. That is also the case with justice. It is one, but not unique. The police, as one of the institutions for justice, are also one, but the question is whether its truth is unique. It has been said (by Dostoevsky) that if there is one truth, then there is no truth; or, closer to home, by the Montenegrins, that if there are many witnesses, then there are many truths.

The Macedonian police are apparently inclined to throw their doors wide open to the public, and to show their face and the essence of their good intentions to an extent that is not characteristic of the police even in the so-declared most democratic states. The impression that one receives from access to the numerous facts, from those facts—let us call them technical—about numbers and equipment, to the facts about the situation and the sociopolitical course, which can be obtained these days from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, could indicate an undoubted change in everything that this milieu has experienced as the authorities, i.e., the police. In the last two years the police have undergone significant changes; one might say that they are

restructuring in several directions. What you will get as the firm position of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is that the police are being democratized. At the same time, however, a dilemma is appearing over the issue of whether this is not, however, rocking the most stable structure in this society, especially through certain recent events, and furthermore a radical attitude, almost in accordance with the natural course of something of this type, and even an expansion of interests within the framework of the system.

It is significant when a police force reveals its structure, size, and equipment, its views and measures with respect to personnel organization and reorganization, especially in view of the fact that it is in the interest of the police as an institution to be discreet. In spite of everything that we found out, it remains unclear why the police would give up their secrets, which, according to police principles, are a proverbial part of their interests. The prevailing belief in the ministry is that the police are stable and effective, although according to world standards, there are fewer police per capita here, about 650 citizens per policeman, which is half as many police per capita as in other developed countries. A total of 9,778 people are employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as we were told by Minister Ljubomir Frckovski. This figure includes 1,000 vacant positions. There are about 4,500 policemen in uniform, and one can add to that number another 1,500 armed employees with the authority to make arrests (inspectors). The administrative services and services for citizens' affairs, such as the passport, birth registry, and other services, are likewise included in the total figure of almost 10,000, which is not the case with other countries in the world, where these matters are handled by other ministries, i.e., these are civilian services outside the police. According to Frckovski, the other ministries are neither trained enough nor capable of assuming these obligations, which would reduce the number of people employed by the ministry to about 7,000.

The data do not match. The under secretary for public safety, Pavle Trajanov, likewise was not precise, but he talked about the existence of about 7,500 employees in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including 4,000 policemen, about 700 firemen, and 311 employees in administrative services. Who is better informed, the minister or his colleagues?

Thus, the number of policemen per capita is smaller than in other developed countries, but you will frequently hear the opinion that we are becoming a police state. That is not the impression that the minister has, however:

"Not everyone thinks that we are becoming a police state. A police state, by definition, is associated with the powers of the police, the presence or absence of a legal structure in which the police work, and does not have any connection with their number. That implies that the police are usually associated with small, elite secret police forces, which through their powers, without legal restrictions, can do whatever they want, without being seen from the outside. Some of a police state's characteristics may be a consequence of the civil authorities' lack of the abilities and

strength to deal with the corresponding issues, and so those functions are thus assumed by the police."

There is apparently nothing to note about Minister Frckovski's words, except, of course, unless one takes into account certain information which does support the thesis that Macedonia is quietly being transformed into a police state. Specifically, in the latest incident, arbitrarily called "the group of 24" (and some people say the entire SDB), detentions and arrests (in broad daylight by "special" special forces) were observed, along with interrogations, threats, and pressures, not to mention wiretaps. That is still outside the law, but in the name of the state and the president. When such measures and methods start to be used among "policemen," then it does not take much imagination to think about the road that we are on and where we will end up.

And even if the government is aware of the entire affair—and there has not been a word from it, even though the specific case that we are talking about nonspecifically and imprecisely has been known since 29 December 1992—then one can understand the self-assured observation by Minister Frckovski that "The only ministry that is functioning as a whole is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The others were found to be like semiministries. Work was done half by them, and half in an alliance. This was the only ministry formed that covered, and was tied to, the state. In a situation of terrible pressure from all the neighboring countries, the lack of protection of borders, the systematic growth of crime, the pressure of the arms trade, the altogether terrible political structure that is being formed, together with the terrible political structure being formed by amateurs and people acting on impulse and under pressure—and now they are the main ones in politics—in a situation in which there are no institutions, nor a collective memory of individualism and democracy, part of all the ministries' work has been assumed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Above all, it is burdened by people's fear of each other, the Albanians' fear of the Macedonians and vice versa. It is likewise combined with a collective memory of the absence of a historical conflict between those two peoples, which helps in this situation. All of this is submerged in a depressed economic situation. After two years of experience with democracy, the story is different. If one does not fall under a dictatorship during the postcommunist period, during the initial period that ethnic and religious extremism appears, and comes in through the front door. The situation is more relaxed now. It is known now, from top to bottom—I am not talking about myself, but rather about those political structures which have influence—that the system should be explained to them, and it should be made clear to them what this constitution means, for example. In general, it has not been clear to them what it means."

Whatever the case, being a state, it has to function, or at least try to function. Consequently, the other forms of government and political factors hurried to give their own judgment of the police, and as their immediate occasion, in addition to the unrest and the protests that ended approximately as described in the beginning, they also used the

frictions within the police, which gave rise to real incidents through the media. In particular, the SDB, as one of the most mysterious areas of the Interior Ministry's activity, was also of interest to the parliamentary commission that is undertaking an investigation of the ministry regarding surveillance, wiretapping, and the inspection of the mail of members of individual party leaderships, and the extent to which its work is within the framework of the laws and the constitution.

According to Slobodan Bogovski, this commission worked with incomplete staffing and without discrimination and familiarity with its own authority. As we were told, the commission, under the leadership of Stoile Stojkov, nevertheless encountered understanding on the part of the Service, which, although it was not obligated to do all this, nevertheless presented all the material to the commission's members, or rather those which remained from the original personnel, namely three parliamentarians from VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity] and one from PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity Party-National Democratic Party]. The material found by the commission talks about the existence of wiretapped conversations that deal with VMRO's contacts with Bulgaria and other contacts that it made. As we were told by Bogovski, VMRO, the party that is stating the accusations, after this information about the material in the SDB's possession, requested that that material not be made public. And, in addition to everything else, the police, on behalf of "the general interests and the security of the state," can assume the right, within the framework of the "rules of the service," can take steps that they consider necessary, and that also includes the actions of which they are accused by several political parties. "It is strange," he concluded, "that the commission that is adopting the conclusions consists of three members who belong to the same party."

The accusations against the police, especially by the VMRO, include, among other things, conducting a personnel policy that is in favor of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the other left-wing parties, with general assessments of the police as a Serbo-communist crew of the leadership. "The spirit of Kolisevism still has not disappeared from that service," stated Aleksandar Dinevski, a former assistant chief of one of the departments in State Security, who was suspended at one time for betraying official secrets; as an additional reason for questioning the Interior Ministry's work, he added that "Statehood has not yet been defined, so the service itself is in the position of defending an unformed state." Likewise, according to Dinevski, "the process of transformation in that service is not taking place in accordance with the principles that apply in the world, but is instead taking place at the instigation of just one party, namely the SDSM, and all of this is due to Minister Frckovski and his closest colleagues."

It seems, however, that Dinevski is not the only one who has such an opinion as a former person on the inside. Approximately the same assessments can also be heard

from members of this service who were, arbitrarily speaking, on the opposite side in the previous case of the group of eight (which included Dinevski). Perhaps more light is shed on things in this ministry by the knowledge that irregularities in operation, the abuse of authority, and violation of the law are still present, and that it has never been otherwise. Different interest groups are explaining the same thing with the information about this. This is natural, so to speak. In fact, it seems that what is going on is a reprise of the political battle. The "repressed group of eight" at that time have come to power now, and those who did not support them then, according to some speculations, are a target for their revenge. The only thing that remains unchanged is the vocabulary with which the opponents are greeted: idlers, incompetents, "young, handsome, and polished," as Frckovski calls the new dissidents, or people with political guilty consciences, as was heard in two cases, and Bogovski, until recently Dinevski's superior and an under secretary for state security, assessed his fellow fighter and employee as a "young, ambitious worker, but with a questionable psychological structure." In his opinion, Dinevski's dissatisfaction is also due to his failure to be appointed to the position of assistant minister for information, and so he saw the advancement of his political career in an alliance with VMRO's party interests. Approximately the same assessment, if not worse, is circulating regarding the others (who for the time being are remaining nameless to the public at large) in the permanent administrative structure.

In addition to everything that is indicated by the facts about the internal disunity and political settling of scores in the Interior Ministry, one can also look at the catastrophic situation in society, in which the parties, not having any place else, see their survival as lying in the infiltration of the bodies, which essentially should be at the service of the citizens, regardless of political or any other membership. The police are a structure which, although not immune to internal upheavals, is nevertheless very solidly set up and organized to function smoothly, regardless of the situation prevailing in society. Thus, the entire people is in a situation in which the state can fall apart as a consequence of a financial collapse and political chaos, but the political parties, seeing that they no longer have any influence at all among their voters, see the police as an opportunity to function as elements in authority, and, through political pressures, to fulfill their own political interests. Thus, there is once again an aspiration for political police, and this, at the very least, should mean that the political parties, which have been involved publicly with the police for an entire year in one way or another, have a "Bolshevist" mentality. All of this, naturally, is concealed by loud insistence on the departy-ization of the police. It is not surprising that the political factors and parties, without exception, are trying as hard as they can to have their own channels and influence precisely there—in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, during this period, can be compared with the only strong stock company in an economic and political desert, where everyone is trying at any price to obtain some of the shares. In conditions in which no other system of

democratic rule can succeed, influence within police structures is seen as an effective possibility for exercising influence in society.

The extent of the parties' interest in occupying positions within the police can be seen most easily in the parties' systematic involvement with the numerous public communiques in which they accuse each other of monopolizing and politicizing the police. The number of mutual attacks by the parties in public, which cover substantive aspects of the police's work, is a sure sign that the situation, not just in the civilian part of society but also in the uniformed part, is indicating the collapse of the system. And now, whoever gobbles up more of the police cake will rule. Thus, if the state collapses, and the police succeed in maintaining themselves but in so doing fall into party hands, we will have a Latin American model of a police dictatorship, which would be the worst option for any state, and especially for a state like Macedonia.

On several occasions, there were attempts to have the head of the ministry, in addition to the attacks saying that he was the SDSM's man, characterized as a victim of his own colleagues. "Externally, there can only be a picture of the situation," Minister Frckovski responded self-confidently to this rather widely held opinion, "but predominantly among people who are not sufficiently informed about what is happening in the ministry. Two theses were expressed in parliament: a thesis according to which the policemen are good, but the minister has ordered them to do this, and according to which it turns out that I am determining all these matters internally, as well as the opposite thesis, according to which the minister is good, but his colleagues are dressing up the data for him. These are two different theses, which are mutually exclusive. Both of them are wrong, however. I am handling the work here, the work that is handled by the minister everywhere. The work that the minister does not handle does not interest me, until an incident occurs, and then it comes to me. These are specific actions and decisions that come to me for my signature. The overall solutions and the key actions are handled by me, as well as what I want to handle. That does not have anything to do with responsibility. The minister is responsible in any alternative whatsoever. You cannot relieve the minister of the responsibility if he knew or did not know something. He is responsible by the definition of his position."

The police, by definition, should be concerned about citizens' safety. The ministry is convinced that this task is being performed with maximum correctness, even in the conditions of a twofold increase in crime, when the number of policemen is remaining the same. Pavle Trajanov, the under secretary for public safety, says that in the last two years the police have been tremendously involved in the area of protecting public safety. No one doubts this, but how it is being ensured still remains to be discussed. In other words, where are we in relations between the police and citizens? According to Trajanov, "With respect to the democratization of relations between the police and citizens, one can say that in comparison with previous years, in

1992 there were incomparably fewer petitions and complaints about the police's conduct toward citizens."

Last year, there were 138 petitions from citizens about the conduct of policemen toward them, 11 of which were justified. Citizens usually complain about the unjustified use of force and incorrect conduct. As a curiosity, Trajanov also mentioned the fact that there were 12 complaints from citizens that policemen had not taken harsh enough measures. That was probably supposed to be an indirect indication of the tenderness and mildness of Interior Ministry employees in their contacts with citizens.

With respect to relations between police and citizens in the present conditions, one should not take into account the overall social atmosphere in and regarding the state; otherwise this will devalue the figures and percentages that are supposed to be an illustration of democratization. In conditions in which life is worth less and less in the bloody carnival, mass murders and moral degradation, sometimes the system for the evaluation of actions is completely distorted. Another problem is the possibility of so much of a loss of confidence in a possible justice that would protect the citizen from his policeman that there is no sense in any sort of insistence upon it at all. A broken bone or a trampled demonstrator in clearing a street is seen as an inevitable, but also standard form of communication between citizens and the authorities, so that there is neglect for the protection of a certain basic civil right that can be seen, apparently, in details. The modernization of the police and of their methods for preserving public safety in today's conditions, in spite of what is probably wholehearted support from the top leadership, seems to be going very slowly. This is happening most of all because of the terrible increase in crime, which is also acquiring sophisticated forms of its own, and all of this is combined with the blockade, and the lack of enough time, conditions, and means for a truly well-educated police force that will be loyal to civil rights and freedoms. It is not very easy in particular for a structure like the police, which existed for many years as an instrument of coercion, to change their working methods suddenly.

Since Frckovski's arrival there, 30 percent of the old personnel are still left at the ministry; at first glance this can be viewed as a positive fact, but even at "second glance" this sort of fresh air in such a powerful institution also has its dark side, which consists of the numerous dangers from the formation of inexperienced police, whose personnel will include young, and naturally very ambitious people, who want to prove something to themselves and others. In spite of everything, the extent of the rejuvenation that has been carried out, in our constant political conditions, is simply being offered to the political parties on a platter as one more proof of political purges. No matter how pure the intentions are, this can always be a motive for politicization and for the creation of stories, and even myths.

[Box, p 12]

Interview with Minister of Internal Affairs Ljubomir Frckovski by Dzahir Derala; place and date not given

Political Guilty Consciences

"There are some people who are from my own generation, but it is not clear to me what they are essentially seeking. They never came to tell me what internal irregularities there were. They did it with the politicians who received them," says the minister of internal affairs.

[Derala] Has the danger that the present police might be returned to the role of a political police again passed?

[Frckovski] No, something like that has no chance.

[Derala] Then what is this political turmoil about the police due to?

[Frckovski] The MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is a place where information comes before it goes to political circles, a place that has not been exposed to the situation before and after the elections, since in the year before the elections, when it abandoned its ties with the party, it was felt very directly here. During and after the elections, there are no definite political authorities under which this ministry belongs. All the political parties are still in the cradle, premature babies, frivolous, and like suckling babes, they are attaching themselves to the core of information that appears here. In the second place, the weaker a party is, the more envious it is of a structure that has that element of authority which it does not have in itself but feels that it needs to have, and this ministry is like that. Thus, inclinations to possess a certain channel of information are appearing.

[Derala] Does that mean that "the weak parties" are asserting a claim to the authorities...?

[Frckovski] Practically all the parties. Apparently the large parties are the strong ones. They are only strong in comparison with the weaker parties, however. Nevertheless, as a structure, they have not been completed as parties. That can be seen from the number of paid employees that the parties themselves have. There is nothing like that here, or else it is forming. The attitude toward the Ministry in a situation like that is bizarre. It is an abnormal situation. The ministry should be purged, and the problems of the malignant personnel who are lost to the police but are working within their ranks should be solved.

[Derala] Why do you say that they are lost?

[Frckovski] Because they have a political guilty conscience, and they have done so many things that they cannot function. They are definitely hiding behind someone's skirt. In the Bible, and also in the Koran, there is the same opinion, an *ajet* [passage in the Koran] that says that when a person loses his shame he can do anything and say anything. That purge is going on, in a way, and it can include some people who have lost their shame even in the new teams, but the main thing, when you take that mixture that resembles chopped meat, is that the purge is taking place. The ministry now has 70 percent young professionals, in all the structures. When I came to it there were

50 percent. There are about 15 percent of the old professionals, regarding whom everyone unanimously claims that they are "pure," that they are not "tainted," "contaminated...."

[Derala] You said that the political parties, as structures, are very weak, in contrast to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, as a structure, is solidly built and professionalized. Are the claims about the police's unobstructed striving for as much power as possible correct?

[Frckovski] We have three assumptions here: The first one is that the parties are weak, the second is that the police are structurally stronger, and the third assumption is that the two groups are struggling for power. The conclusion is that the police have a better chance to seize power. This logic is wrong. It would have been an interesting attitude during the period before, during, and immediately after the elections. Now it is impossible, since the structure of the authorities is defined by the Constitution. This is not a question of the parties, since the Constitution defines the institutions. The parties are the dynamic part of the political system, and the constitution does not define them. What the Constitution defines is the static part of the political system, i.e., the institutions.

There are indications that during the problematic period the ministry was effectively in the service of a large number of the parties, because of that bizarre nature of the relationships. With the definition of the structures of the authorities, it has been cleared up from top to bottom. Then possibilities are created for a real step toward the definite departy-ization of the police. The policemen instinctively perceive that process positively, independently of demagoguery. They have felt what is meant by the arrival of the head of one party or another, and how it rocks the entire structure. It is not just that the state is in danger, but also their own separate existences. That is the reason for the instinctive support for professionalizing the work. Essentially there are no problems here. They are occurring with individuals who are still poisoned. There are always so-called incidents. When the course of the transformation was finally stabilized, blood vessels burst in several places where they were weak, i.e., where people who thought that they could survive by hiding under departy-ization, but were intimately associated with specific individuals and the party. Thus, there was an explosion with the VMRO's sympathizers, with those who were less professional. On the other hand, another small group is exploding now. To the best of my knowledge, there are about 20 signers, of whom there is a hard core of seven or eight people who, in my opinion, are useless human material. They are the same version as the previous case, with the opposite party labels. I know some of those people personally and I personally promoted them by two or three steps so that they would not feel like throwbacks to unanimity, more precisely to the period of communist voluntarism.

[Derala] Why?

[Frckovski] Above all, because I knew that they were useless as policemen, but at the same time I did not want to exert any pressure or to have them be in certain positions

that they would perceive as a continuation of some sort of injustice from their replacement. You can never get rid of petty politicians in the police, however, since they are not interested in the advancement in which every person who works is interested. Those people, in the police, are what are called people fighting for power on the outside. This is a team that would like to occupy positions until their people are in charge. Expecting that with me, proceeding by that logic of the VMRO that I am a representative of the left-wing bloc, and they are repressed, put aside, and otherwise, so to speak, "the dogs of the left-wing bloc" that would bite for it—they will enter into a scheme.

It should be known that personnel policy in the police is not carried out depending on whose the minister is, but rather in accordance with the internal differentiation of the work. When something that is expected does not happen, certain people who were essentially always politicians or court ladies in the police did what they did. There are several people who are from my generation, but it is not clear to me what they are essentially seeking. They never came to me to say what internal irregularities there were. They did it with the politicians who received them, and that was those politicians like Ante Popovski, Stojan Andov, and others. You see, we are not in favor of having this escalate, but rather, above all, that it be resolved within the framework of the MVR. Accordingly, it would be logical for them to talk with me about those so-called irregularities in the MVR.

Some of that [human] material is useless, and I am not thinking at all of reaching any compromises with them, regardless of how it will be reflected. I have a personal interest in its finally becoming public. I am not going to drop their case in the fact of blackmail about their case's becoming public. That has to be clear to them, regardless of whether it comes from any political structure that will try to talk with me with its own suggestions.

[Box, p 33]

Trust in the Police

Most respondents feel safe with this kind of police.

In a telephone public opinion poll that PULS conducted with 300 randomly selected telephone subscribers in the Republic of Macedonia on 5 and 6 February, almost two-thirds of the respondents answered that the police in Macedonia are working within the framework of the legal regulations (29.00 percent), and that our police are partly powerful (35.67 percent). Every tenth respondent (10.33 percent) thinks that the police are too powerful, 7.67 of those polled think that the police are not powerful at all, and 17.33 percent do not have a position formulated on this issue.

In response to our second question, 59.00 percent of the participants in the poll answered that they felt safe with this kind of police, but 27.67 percent do not feel safe. This question was not answered by 13.33 percent of those polled.

In response to the first question, most of the male population answered that the police were partly powerful (33.33 percent), and that they were working within the framework of the laws (29.08 percent). In response to the question about whether they felt safe with this kind of police, 54.61 percent of the men answered affirmatively, and 32.62 percent negatively. Of the female respondents, only 5.66 percent think that the police are too powerful, 28.93 percent think that the police are working within the framework of the laws, and 37.74 percent think that the police are partly powerful. Almost two-thirds of the women, or 62.89 percent, feel safe with these police, while 23.27 percent do not have that feeling. Obviously, women have more trust in the police than the men.

Among respondents in the three age categories, no major deviations were observed in the answers received. The only striking thing is that the middle generation thinks somewhat more than the others that the police have too much power (14.58 percent), while the largest percentage of the oldest generation thinks that the police are not powerful at all (11.11 percent). The youngest (aged 18 to 33) feel somewhat less safe than the others (35.61 percent), but in general, in response to this question as well, in all categories between one-half and two-thirds feel safe with these police.

The largest deviations among the respondents were observed in comparing the answers of different educational categories. The police are too powerful for 6.52 percent of those with an elementary education, for 9.50 of those with a secondary education, and for 14.67 percent of those with a higher or high education. Most of the ones with an elementary education do not have an answer to this question (as much as 41.30 percent), the ones with a secondary education primarily think that the police are partly powerful (40.78 percent), and most of the most educated category think that the police are working within the framework of the legal regulations (37.33 percent), but not one of them answered that the police were not powerful at all.

Among the unemployed and employees in the social-state sector, there are no significant deviations in their answers in comparison with the general distribution.

The distribution of the answers among the respondents of different nationalities is likewise without any major deviations. Shown in percentages, 10.51 percent of the Macedonians, 10.00 percent of the Albanians, and 8.33 percent of the Serbs think that the police are too powerful, 29.96 percent of the Macedonians and 20.00 percent of the Albanians think that the police are working within the framework of the laws, and 37.35 percent of the Macedonians, 30.00 percent of the Albanians, and 25.00 percent of the Serbs think that the police are partly powerful. A feeling of safety with these police is felt by 60.31 percent of the Macedonians, 45.00 percent of the Albanians, and exactly half of the Serbs, and 27.63 percent of the Macedonians, 30.00 percent of the Albanians, and one-fourth of the Serbs do not feel safe. The other nationalities were not sufficiently represented in our poll for us to be able to draw relevant conclusions.

One of our goals was to compare the opinions of the police among members of different political parties. Only 4.67 percent of the respondents, however, identified themselves as members of one of the political parties, 2.67 percent did not want to answer this question, and as many as 92.67 percent stated that they were not members of any political party.

Do you feel safe with this kind of police?

Yes	59.00%
No	27.67%
Don't know	13.33%

How powerful are the police in Macedonia?

Too powerful	10.33%
According to the law	29.00%
Partly	35.67%
Not at all	7.67%
Don't know	17.33%

*** Infrastructure, Ecological Problems Examined**

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pp 6-7

[Unattributed interview with Antonio Pesev, minister of city planning, construction, transportation, and ecology; place and date not given: "He Does Not Have a Pedigree, but He Has Ideas"]

[Text] One of the ministers in the Macedonian government who departs in many respects from the stereotype of politicians, of course, is Mr. Antonio Pesev, the head of the very cumbersome Ministry of City Planning, Construction, Transportation, and Ecology. Not only is he the youngest one in the government, but this is also the first time that someone without a political "pedigree," and moreover from the private sector, has come to such a position. This sort of "galloping" climb by Pesev up the ladder of a political career, possibly in addition to chance, is also due to the courage that the "stars" gave the present minister, since ambition, diligence, rationality, and perfectionism in performing work are also characteristics of his zodiac sign, Virgo, which promise him success in his career and in business in his future life.

Heading a ministry in conditions in which the ownership of apartments is being resolved, we are surrounded by blockades, and we are poisoned by gases, is undoubtedly neither an easy task nor a pleasant one. We found out how the minister is succeeding in solving the problems in the key spheres that his ministry covers and how much of an influence his experience from private business has had from a three-hour interview in which Pesev talked especially for VECER.

Uniprokom

[VECER] Before we go on to the problems that your ministry handles, we would like to know how much truth

there is in the slanders that are heard more and more often these days among residents of Skopje about your participation in the newly formed television station at Uniprokom. Are you involved in this project that has just been approved by the Ministry of City Planning, and how?

[Pesev] If I am being associated with it as an owner, it is wrong! I can state that it is a significant investment, in which I would be pleased to be included. The new television station as an alternative one will mean a great deal in the overall development of communications and information, just as is the case with private radio stations. The owner, as is well known, is Velija Ramovski, with whom I have collaborated in the past.

[VECER] What field was that collaboration in?

[Pesev] Don't misunderstand me. He is a member of the Chamber of Private Capital, to which I belong, and I am still its active president. I fully support the idea of opening an alternative TV station. As the chamber's medium it will mean a great deal, and as support for the idea of uniting private businessmen, it will have enormous influence. Otherwise, let me say that there were other requests, such as those from Sileks, Skaj Radio, NOVA MAKEDONIJA, and so forth, but Uniprokom acquired the most modern equipment, which even the national television station can envy.

[VECER] How much influence did you have in giving the permit for a private television station precisely to Uniprokom?

[Pesev] I am not a co-owner, nor do I have any sort of influence as minister. I only have influence as a member of the chamber, especially since the idea of such an alternative TV station comes from a long time ago and from most of the chamber's members—myself, and Velija, and Fufo.... After all, private businessmen from now on will defend the situation, and moreover as an association which is carefully, gradually, but certainly fighting for its own status.

Business

[VECER] You are now in a new position, completely different from the one that you have before you became a minister. Many people know that you are the owner of the private firm Ultra Prom. Is your absence from the firm being felt at this time?

[Pesev] If you are asking me, of course the firm is suffering. Although the firm is the property of three people, I consider myself important for its operation, especially since my participation was in the area of new projects. In a certain way, in that sense, it is crippled now. In spite of that, however, the firm is still functioning well, just as it was before my departure. My wife, who was previously the director, is in my place now. Thanks to the mechanisms that were well established previously, good customers, and favorable prices, Ultra Prom is doing great! More precisely, it is just as we prepared it to be for many years.

[VECER] The experience from the last government showed that many ministers made a handsome profit from their "armchairs" during their term. It is not a secret that

immediately after leaving they became involved in their own firms, not infrequently with mixed foreign capital as well. Are you satisfied with what you are being offered as compensation for working in the ministry, and how much are the earnings that you are receiving from the firm?

[Pesev] I do not have problems with pay. The firm is doing well, and my earnings from dividends and extra income are continuing. It is an interesting philosophy that from this aspect I have been relieved of the problems of subsistence. Now I have an opportunity for more radical initiatives, and furthermore for pondering about not losing my position as minister because of mistaken assessments, although, to tell you the truth, I was much more powerful as president of the chamber. I have even been cramped here. For example, now I do not have the chauffeur that I did at the firm. I cannot think about an assistance for certain minor work, although at Ultra Prom I had a person responsible for it. I do not have my own typist here. In principle, I am "too short" here for certain privileges that I had there. Here I do not have the possibility of firing someone just by snapping my fingers if I think that he is not fulfilling his obligations. It is simply that here you are always under a "magnifying glass." It is necessary to have a good reason for doing it, because they will always ask you, "Why did you leave the man in the street?" This is a completely different situation. These are the conditions under which I undertook to be the minister, however, and that is that. I am not running away from it.

[VECER] With your coming to the position of minister, a process has begun in which it is easier for private businessmen to win positions, not just in economic life, but also in the country's political life. How do you view these changes?

[Pesev] Someone has to be the first to set precedents. When it happens, it is much easier to get used to it. More and more, we will have people who are also successful in politics. The most illustrative example is the experience with the present government of Lebanon, in which the people have enormous trust because the prime minister is one of the best businessmen there at the moment. Thus, it is logical that if someone trusts him as a businessman, there is no reason not to believe that he will also do good work in another sphere, and even in politics. We cannot expect anyone to be good in other positions, if he does not complete his work successfully at home. This should become the rule to be considered here as well.

Apartments

[VECER] With respect to the problems that the ministry is facing these days, the "sorest" spot, of course, is the purchase of socially owned apartments. Most of the criticism of this law under which the apartments are being sold now is directed at you. The citizens are reacting the most to the high price of the apartments, as well as to the unfair treatment of those who are deciding to buy an apartment by installment payments. How would you comment on this?

[Pesev] This business has been very much misinterpreted. We did not want to force people to decide whether to buy

an apartment or go into the street. That is not the purpose. The biggest obstacle to the idea of selling the apartments is the fact that people feel more affected, thinking that if they do not buy the apartments now, they are facing a catastrophe! What we wanted to happen was to have the apartments purchased on a large scale. Now we can talk here about whether the assessment of the level at which we stopped is good or bad, and whether we overestimated or underestimated the sale of the socially owned apartments. Everyone makes his own calculation individually. There are two segments. You buy the property or you pay rent. When you buy it, state subsidies do not exist. There is an estimate and a price at which the product is sold, and the conditions under which it is bought. Social structure and logic do not function here. Nevertheless, in the second segment, i.e., the use of the space, there is a social welfare element, i.e., the social structure, plans and programs, subsidized rents, and assistance in paying rent. All this exists as a mechanism. Perhaps it would have been better and we would have more buyers if the price had been lower. We were put in the situation in advance, however, of estimating something on which we did not have substantive facts.

[VECER] Isn't it unrealistic to have the size of the installment approximately equal to the monthly rent for all those who decided to buy the apartments on installments?

[Pesev] If we proceed from the fact that one apartment is amortized in 50 years, then 2 percent annually is a normal amortization, without earning a single denar from that apartment. We do not have to take that as a principle, however. We as a state can subsidize this business. We will say that we will lose money. Citizens' social welfare status, however, does not permit us to deviate from this principle. Through the decision by the government and the Assembly, even though we are aware that an apartment will last for 50 years, we as a state said that we would turn it over at the rate of 100 years, i.e., with 1-percent amortization. For example, if an apartment is appraised at 36,000 German marks [DM], it follows that the monthly installment is DM30. If currently the minimum wage is DM100, it follows that we are "entering" the basic social welfare criterion—the installment's being more than a third of the wage.

[VECER] The fact, however, is that the minimum wage is much lower than DM100.

[Pesev] This law does not regulate that! Let us see then how to help people who do not have an apartment—more precisely, those who are obliged to pay DM100 in monthly rent for the same apartment, and have a contract for a specific period. What happens to them, if one knows, for example, that the apartments that are being sold now are only 10 percent of the existing inventory, and my estimate is that after completing and purchasing the installments, what will be left will only be 5 percent of the total inventory.

Transportation

[VECER] The second key field in your ministry, which came to the fore last year in terms of topicality, is transportation, of course. The blockades showed that in the past, the best policy was not conducted with respect to the railroad and road infrastructure. Now there are certain innovations with respect to the construction of alternative railroad routes to the east. What are they?

[Pesev] It is definitely clear! Next year the investment in the Republic, either from loans or from aid, will be the railroad! An effort will be made to obtain funds in a "package," and use them for the construction of a large infrastructural facility. The railroad infrastructure that we have now is very poor. We do not have enough routes to the east, but also to the west, toward Albania. There are several options for covering the eastern corridor: Kumanovo-Kriva Palanka-Bulgarian border, or Stip-Kocani-Delcevo-border, and the "forgotten" Strumica region, which is literally cut off, is also a possibility. The comparative advantages will show which option will be chosen. Nevertheless, even though it does not suit us, a great many things will also depend on our neighbors—whether they will be interested in investing, for example, in rebuilding the existing line in the direction of Kumanovo, or building a new one! If we go into debt as a state, it will be precisely for this purpose. Otherwise, it has already been proven that without alternative railroad routes, a state cannot function. Another matter, to which attention will likewise be devoted, is the scale of the railroad, which, of course, will also depend on the state's attitude and capabilities.

[VECER] Will there be any investment in completing the highway this year?

[Pesev] There is no logic in investing in a "dead" body without "blood circulation." Many other road routes are much higher priorities, such as, for example, Tetovo-Gostivar, on which work is already being done, and there was a bottleneck on this section. The only thing that is not clear to me is why, when the road from Kicevo was built, it stopped before Ohrid. Likewise, the 60-km railroad line from Kicevo to Ohrid was not finished, and now funds will have to be found for it. That would ensure contact with the Albanian border, through which we could make use of Durres. Another good idea which was initiated in the meeting with Albanian President Berisha is to build terminals at the border crossings that would be used by drivers; this would avoid traveling through the bad road network in Albania, and goods would be brought by container transportation to the border, and from there by truck through the Republic.

Phillipps

[VECER] The situation in air transportation, particularly since last year, when it experienced a sort of "bloom," is not at an enviable level either. The "Macedonia" public enterprise for airport services is a state within a state, and it seems that there are no instruments to control it. What is the ministry undertaking in this regard?

[Pesev] Everywhere in the world there are civil aviation directorates, which assume powers in the area of security. Because of the lack of adequate legal regulations, however, since last December these obligations have been assumed by a new section in the ministry, which is not much different from the directorates, either in tasks or in the systemization. It was important to put this department on a sound footing, and to overcome the existing problems. Until now maintenance of the airports, to a great extent, was the state's obligation, because a considerable part of the airports' functions was also utilized for the air force, and there were tremendous ambiguities regarding obligations and rights.

[VECER] What sort of changes are there now?

[Pesev] First of all, the previous director has been replaced. A new one has not been appointed yet, because it should be a person with exceptional familiarity with international law, since he will be signing agreements in the name of the state. The Skopje airport is an exclusively civilian one, which means that there is a possibility of new investments with the participation of foreign capital. With respect to the public enterprise, from now on it will have the funds from "handling" as its income, while the "landing" funds will be earmarked for the state, exclusively for reconstruction.

[VECER] There are indications that Phillipps is interested in investing. What does this involve?

[Pesev] Phillipps is showing a lot of interest in investing in the reconstruction of airports, namely with part of the 50 million ECU's [European Currency Units] from the EC that belongs to the Netherlands. This is not the only bid. There has also been an application from one company in the United States, but also one from Turkey, with an extremely frivolous proposal. It wants to invest as much as 90 percent of the funds and have the future national carrier under its own authority.

[VECER] What will you say about the rumors claiming that the contacts with Phillipps are being handled through your firm and that you will have a direct interest in its possible inclusion in the work?

[Pesev] The meeting with Phillipps was at an official level in the Netherlands. In principle, the idea that has been spread would not be bad if it were true. It should not be forgotten that it is a serious project and a tremendous undertaking, and anything like that will necessarily come to light. To my taste, such "involvements" on my part would be despicable.

Ecology

[VECER] For a rather long time now, ever since the previous term, this ministry has almost not been functioning at all as a Ministry of Ecology. What is the reason—in addition to objective reasons (the lack of personnel), is a role also played by a subjective assessment that the other areas in the ministry are higher priority at the moment?

[Pesev] No, not in the least! So far, the attitude toward the ecology has been the one that we inherited from the former

Yugoslavia and that all developing countries have—in the race for some sort of profit, a level, they lose the attitude that they should do something for environmental protection, and usually they start it when it is already too late. That is not the attitude that this ministry has toward the ecology, however. Objectively, we do not have all the necessary powers. We do not have a law with a policy for sanctions, nor even an inspectorate. Without these two factors, almost nothing can be done. And if an inspection service is formed, but does not have a strong legal policy for sanctions available, it will only be registering conditions, like the inspectorates in other ministries that deal with this area. For that reason, we proceeded in the opposite direction, passing a law on environmental protection, with its strict punitive policy. I will insist that that law (it has already been drafted) be passed in accelerated proceedings this very month, while there are still no more fresh ecological incidents (the air pollution in Skopje, and the death of the fish in the Vardar). Well, on this occasion I promise the citizens that with this law, many things will change. With the formation of an ecological inspectorate, the sanctions that are the highest ones allowed by the Macedonian criminal code—it has also provided for a sentence of imprisonment, a registry of polluters, and other measures that were missing until now—the effects of our work will begin to become evident, and then we will accept any responsibility and any criticism.

[VECER] You were criticized for not speaking up or even initiating any activity or measure during the smog siege in Skopje.

[Pesev] The main participants in the activities were the ministries that have inspectorates with authority. Well, here is where our handicap, which you mentioned, can be seen. We could participate verbally, in order to justify ourselves, and that would also score some political point for us. But we did not have either a mechanism or an objective possibility of undertaking anything specific. Nevertheless, my assistant for ecology, Nikola Sribnovski, was continually in contact with the appropriate institutions, inspectorates, and the City Assembly, and participated in adopting measures. I nevertheless think that it is much more important for us to work on the specific goal—passing the law as quickly as possible—than to express ourselves verbally.

[VECER] The ministry is overloaded with areas. Some people call it an omnibus ministry. Do you think that the area of ecology should be separated into a separate body, a ministry or institute under the direct jurisdiction of the state?

[Pesev] I think that ecology should be together with city planning, at least at this time, since the largest ecological problems in our country are precisely in the urban areas, primarily in Skopje and Titov Veles. If it were independent, the Ministry of Ecology, in this current situation, would be an "orphan" that would constantly be asking the other ministries for something. In combination with city planning, however, of course reinforced by decisive legal regulations, it will get control over the industrial polluters,

primarily the 10 largest ones in the Republic. That kind of ministry will have multidisciplinary personnel and "draconian" penalties, which will have an effect. Likewise, this ministry's jurisdiction should include one of the measures that we provided for in this law—the formation of a continual source of funds earmarked for ecological investments. We are proposing that it be an ecological tax, which would be paid by the polluters.

Resignation

[VECER] The ecologists, in spite of their bitterness, have not demanded your resignation. It is being done by the transporters. Why haven't you responded?

[Pesev] I did not react because I think that one should not react to accusations without arguments. When someone attacks me, he should say that he is attacking me because of this and that.... If one looks at the transporters' accusations, one will see that the biggest sin, according to them, is that I did not attend their recent meetings, even though the ministry's number-two man was present. I admit that perhaps the ministry is not responding at the pace that the transporters need, but that was the situation, and the results were what we were able to achieve! It was not possible to do more than that. Transportation has been liberalized with Bulgaria and Albania. It is interesting that even in conditions in which we do not have any kind of dialogue with Greece, we succeeded in reaching an agreement, even though they then rejected it. We are buying permits (approvals) at the border, just as is the case with Germany. Romania only gave us 200, but that is the maximum.... We are not magicians who can create permits, when for every tenth letter we received the answer that the exchange of documents for transit could be resolved after the recognition of Macedonia, in bilateral protocols at the government level. If diplomatic mechanisms were functioning, and the ministry did not do anything, in that case I would agree and I would say that I was not the "personnel" for this job. Otherwise, perhaps, the true solution for the problems regarding the transporters' permits would be the formation of a foreign trade ministry that would fulfill the present fragmented obligations that are in the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of the Economy, and of the one for foreign relations, but also of the Ministry of City Planning.

[VECER] What will happen after the end of your term?

[Pesev] It is true that being a minister will help me a great deal, regardless of whether it is interrupted or completed honestly, bravely or not, with lovely ideas but few results. I now have much broader views and more information. I have observed the state's overall economy. I have become familiar with the centers of power, which were not apparent to me from "below," simply because when you are a private businessman, you are left aside, and you only look at the big economy as a fortress which guards your spheres of interest for you.

[VECER] How are you coordinating your ministerial obligations with those in your business and private life?

[Pesev] Not at all!

* Ramifications of Power Plant Strike

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p 13

[Article by Lilica Kitanovska: "A Leap With Obstruction"]

[Text] *How the citizens feel when the court makes a cut that is ignored.*

A citizen complained that when the Constitutional Court announces its rulings he understands nothing, or if he understand something he ends up disappointed. This, apparently, is a problem shared by many. Of late, the Constitutional Court seems to have become very interesting to the media, but seems to have changed from the viewpoint of getting closer to the "broad popular masses." The arid legalistic language in which its announcements are drafted repels, to begin with, a high percentage of the consumers of such information, while the most persistent among them look for interpreters.

Should this be the case, considering that it is most frequently the ordinary citizens who focus their eyes on that court? The court believes that the problem of communicating between citizens and that institution has never existed. Whenever an individual has thought that something may be affecting his interests, be it a case of discrepancy between a legal act and the Constitution or the laws, he has turned and continues to turn to that court. However, as situations go on developing and come to an end, it is as though the connection between the citizen and the Constitutional Court has been broken. It is as though the court is some kind of traitor that has betrayed expectations and all hopes. This is not because the court may have rejected a petition. In the final account this is not what matters most. A sense of betrayal is felt whenever the court cuts something off but the cut is ignored. Quite frequently, this is like plastic surgery. There has been an intervention and on the surface everything seems the same but with slightly changed features. With such interventions, in the course of which nothing material is either lost or gained, many people angrily conclude that everything is makeup, a cosmetic change, and an extremely skillful way of leaving things as they are. Being human, all of us have our ambitions. Why is it that the eight Constitutional Court justices would be the exception? Their mandate, however, does come to an end.

The people who in recent months have remained on top of the present situation in the Republic are Jordan Arsov, chief justice, Vera Terzieva-Trojacanec, Bratoljub Raickovic, Filip Lazareski, Fidanco Stoev, Branka Ciraviri-Antonovska, Araf Arifi, and Dimitrie Dimiskovski. According to the Constitution, there should be nine justices elected by the Assembly, for a nine-year term, with no reelection. The chief justice is appointed for a three-year term, also without the right to be reelected. However, the present "team" was elected by the previous assembly. That is why the Constitution stipulates that the justices must be named no later than three months after the Republic Judicial Council has been constituted. Therefore, the end of their term is near.

However, even the harshest critics of the court's work have their limits. The Constitutional Court has far less freedom of action than it had according to the old Constitution. At that time it could follow events and recapitulate processes in social life. Now, all it can do is determine whether legal acts are consistent with the Constitution and the laws, protect basic rights and freedoms, and determine the responsibilities of the president of the Republic and the constitutionality of the programmatic documents of political parties. Mostly, in this time of pluralism, it must resolve conflicts of the authority of the legislative and the executive powers. Of late, this has been the court's greatest preoccupation.

At the beginning, the justices showed little interest in the new views of constitutional law. For a few months they seemed to be on the defensive. When they could no longer drag the process of adaptation to the new conditions, pressured by new initiatives, their action in determining of constitutionality of the political declaration of the NDP [National Democratic Party] burst on the surface. This was the first issue related to their new duties and the first disappointment. After delaying its ruling for several months, the court issued a resolution that the people felt as being neither here nor there. The Constitutional Court ordered the NDP to "amend" its document, without stipulating the consequences. The court could wait. However, the moment it faced difficulties the court retreated. Then, somehow, it recovered and began to act more daringly. Regretfully, the impression remained that its rulings were belated, that it required too many consultations and weighing of arguments for or against, before it could eventually "amputate" some of the stipulations in such a way that no one could feel any difference.

To what extent is this view on the Constitutional Court the result of justified disappointment or of the actual limitations imposed upon this institution under the new system? "We are doing everything possible to ignore the complaints and expectations of those who submit the various petitions," Jordan Arsov said. "We always emphasize the constitutional-legal aspect of the problems that are submitted to us and try to ignore politics as much as possible." Given the prevailing atmosphere, however, this is obviously hard to swallow. We saw this in the latest deliberations on the case tried by that court, when those who submitted their petition (regardless of its nature) repeatedly emphasized that they support the opposition and that, the way things are moving along, the time is coming when the Constitutional Court will become a real arena of confrontation between the people in power and the opposition. That is because laws are being passed by majority vote, and the fact that a law may fall short of a few votes does not mean that the parliament had not realized that it was about to promulgate an unconstitutional law.

In the past the situation was different because the Constitution was more detailed. Constitutional stipulations governing a large number of specific situations were entirely different than what we have today: We have a relatively "empty" Constitution which offers broad scope for displaying creativity by all sides. Whether it wishes it or not,

the Constitutional Court as well must assume such a creative role. It is true that it cannot and, in the final account, must not suggest models for any specific type of settling relations. However, it should be able to determine whether the intention of the legislator or, respectively, the author of the Constitution intended to set basic standards mandatory to the members of this court. If the Constitutional Court did not exist, the Assembly would pass laws, and government would implement them in accordance with its executive role in the state, and the citizens would live with the illusion that everything is working impeccably. In other words, we should consider ourselves fortunate that we have this authority that both is and is not a classical court that could determine when the limit in confusing authorities has been overstepped in the delegation of powers by the parliament to the government. The justification of the fact that such cases nonetheless occur is that the court is in a "period of transition, when the government is placed in a position of acting quickly because of circumstances that do not tolerate the slowness with which the Assembly acts."

The Constitutional Court shocked the public in one specific case: It issued a ruling temporarily blocking the government's decision to build a refugee camp at Djorje Petrov. What motivated such action by the court, when a precedent of acting with utmost speed in dealing with urgent problems had already been set? Once again the reason should be sought in the new position of the Constitutional Court, according to Arsov. Now, in addition to the Constitution,

there also is an agenda according to which the court works, which allows a fast intervention based on the exceptional gravity of a given issue. In practical terms, everything is affected by the possible consequences of a sluggish approach. In this case, if we were to wait for the development of the regular procedure, the resolution passed by the government would have remained valid (until its unconstitutionality could be proved), the construction of the project would have continued, and it would have been completed within one to three months. Had eventually the court ruled that it was illegal and unconstitutional, in order to impose its authority it would have had to bring in bulldozers and raze the building to the ground. This means that we have begun to think rationally.

The opposite reaction took place in the case of the sale of public housing. The court decided to "anticipate" events and, at the expense of the dissatisfaction of the citizens and, above all, of the Workers Party and all the associations in that area, to opt for the "unrestrained process of conversion of public capital," which began to function according to the Law on the Sale of Public Housing. The court agreed with the reaction and even justified it, but its view is that at that time it acted precisely the way it had to.

Perhaps the citizens' expectations are too high. Finding itself between the state and the law, the position of the Constitutional Court is quite difficult. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the court has given far greater headaches to the Kljusev cabinet.

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